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1 Introduction
In many commonly observed matching markets, agents on one side, called “programs” (e.g.,
employers or colleges), actively recruit agents on the other side, called “applicants” (e.g.,
employees or students). The matching process usually includes an application stage, in
which applicants submit their candidacy to programs of their choice; it is followed by a
screening stage, in which each program costly screens and ranks its candidates.
Due to massive advancements in both information technology and market design, there
has been a welcomed trend toward applicants applying to a larger number of programs. For
instance, in the job market for new graduates of PhD programs in economics, the centralized
platforms – EconJobMarket and AEA Job Opening for Economists – have dramatically
reduced the application cost associated with submitting a job application. As a result,
hiring departments now screen many more candidates (Nguyen, Peters and Poitevin, 2018).
While the traditional matching theory considers application cost as a market friction (see,
e.g., Rogerson, Shimer and Wright, 2005) and welcomes these new developments, a practical
issue has emerged: Programs must screen many more applicants and pay a high cost, which
can be considered as a symptom of market congestion. Costly screening to form preferences
is common in real-life scenarios. Recruiting programs have enough information to rank
applicants only after reviewing their files or conducting interviews. When programs receive
too many applications, congestion occurs, and matching outcomes can be (constrained)
inefficient (Arnosti, Johari and Kanoria, 2016).
These observations motivate us to consider application cost as a tool to manage con-
gestion. Applicants apply to fewer programs when the application cost is higher, which
mitigates market congestion. However, the total welfare effects, including those on match
quality, are ambiguous because a high application cost may preclude some efficient matches.
In a setting of many-to-one matching without transfers, we provide the first empirical
evidence on the performance of a set of popular market designs with different schemes of
application costs. We hypothesize that when designed appropriately, an application cost
can enhance welfare by balancing match quality and screening costs. Inspired by practical
market designs, we consider two forms of application cost: A positive marginal cost and an
application limit, both of which are used in real-life matching markets.1
Our research design is original in that it marries real-life, experimental data with a
1In practice, applicants pay a constant marginal cost if one applies to more programs beyond a limited
number of choices, e.g., NRMP in the U.S. and university admissions in Hungary. An application limit
usually allows applicants to submit a prescribed number of applications. For example, it is adopted in
school choice in New York City and Paris and university admissions in Brazil, Chile, and China.
2
structural analysis. We implement a multiple-elicitation experiment in which application
costs vary across market designs. The experiment allows the effects of application costs on
congestion and match quality to be evaluated directly. Experimental variation in market
design in the field is, however, necessarily limited, and we further conduct comprehensive
counterfactual analyses based on the estimation of a structural model.
We focus on two dimensions of a matching outcome: the congestion/screening costs,
measured by the number of applicants to screen, and match quality, measured by the num-
bers of blocking pairs, the number of unmatched applicants, and the welfare of both sides.
A pair of applicant and program blocks a matching, if both would be better off by being
matched together after leaving their current matches. The stability of a matching, de-
fined as the absence of any blocking pair, is the key to the success of matching markets
(Roth, 1991). Importantly, stability implies Pareto efficiency when both sides are endowed
with strict preferences (Abdulkadiroglu and So¨nmez, 2013).
Our experiment involves the real-life matching of 129 applicants to the 7 master’s pro-
grams at the Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) and was conducted in May 2013 for
admission in the 2013-14 academic year. The experimental market designs are three vari-
ants of the Gale-Shapley Deferred-Acceptance mechanism (DA) encountered in practice:
The traditional DA, under which applicants can apply to all programs without any cost;
DA with truncation (DA-T), under which applicants can apply to no more than four pro-
grams; and DA with cost (DA-C), under which applicants must write a motivation letter for
each additional application beyond the first three applications. Under each mechanism, ev-
ery applicant is required to submit a rank-ordered list of programs (ROL). As applicants are
informed that one of the mechanisms will be implemented, they have incentives to behave
optimally under each mechanism.
Our direct experimental evaluation shows that both DA-T and DA-C reduce the screen-
ing cost of programs without significantly harming match quality. On average, relative to
DA without cost which results in 75 applications per program, each program receives 13
fewer applications under DA-T and 16 fewer under DA-C. Such reductions in congestion
are substantial despite the applicant preferences being rather heterogenous – 85% of the
applicants always obtain their most-preferred program across the market designs.
In our second empirical approach, the structural analysis, we need information on appli-
cant and program preferences as well as applicant beliefs. Because of the strategy-proofness
of DA (Dubins and Freedman, 1981; Roth, 1982) and because we announce in the exper-
iment that it is optimal for applicants to report their true preferences under DA, ROLs
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submitted by applicants under DA are assumed to reveal their true ordinal preferences.
We supplement this information with a survey in which each applicant reports whether a
program is unacceptable to her. This leads to an extended version of the exploded logit
model for the estimation of applicant cardinal preferences. Furthermore, program prefer-
ences are estimated using their observed ranking of applicants. Applicant beliefs are derived
from an applicant’s (incomplete) information on other applicants’ preferences and on how
each program ranks her. Assuming rational expectations and a common prior, we construct
applicant beliefs from estimated parameters governing program and applicant preferences.
We then simulate the equilibrium outcomes of various configurations of DA-T and DA-C.
DA-T can be of any degree K, where K P t1, ..., 7u is the number of choices an applicant
is allowed to submit. Constant marginal costs for every application in DA-C take various
values over a wide range. In equilibrium, applicants choose an optimal strategy under each
market design, while the ranking of applicants by programs is assumed to be constant.
The results show that relative to DA without cost, DA-C with a low cost reduces screen-
ing costs by half without harming match quality; a less-restrictive DA-T, e.g., DA-T-5 and
DA-T-6, does not affect match quality, either, but the reduction in congestion is not as
substantial. As expected, a high-cost DA-C or a highly restrictive DA-T results in lower
match quality because a prohibitively high application cost prevents applicants from apply-
ing to a sufficient number of programs. This leads to a large number of blocking pairs and
unmatched applicants.
These findings show that application costs have promising potential for combating con-
gestion even if the application cost is purely wasteful, and more so when it is a monetary
transfer.
Organization of the paper. We complete this section by a brief review of the related
literature. Section 2 formalizes the many-to-one matching and summarizes the theoretical
predictions. The experiment conducted at TSE is described in Section 3, and Section 4
summarizes the data and provides a direct evaluation. Our structural evaluation is presented
in Section 5. The paper concludes in Section 6 with a discussion of our findings.
Related literature. Congestion in matching markets has been studied extensively, but
often theoretically. One of the earliest papers on the topic is Roth and Xing (1997), who
show that thick markets may suffer from congestion. Search and screening costs hinder the
evaluation of all potential matches by both sides.
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Most related to our research, Arnosti et al. (2016) study the regulation of market con-
gestion using application costs and provide a comprehensive survey of the literature. Their
paper considers a dynamic model of one-to-one matching in which agents (applicants and
employers) arrive and depart over time. All applicants and employers are homogenous. As
in our paper – but in a decentralized setting – each applicant applies to programs at a cost,
and each employer pays a screening cost to verify whether an applicant is compatible. If the
applicant is compatible, the employer makes her an offer without knowing if she has already
been hired by someone else. If she receives an offer, the applicant accepts or rejects it.
These authors also consider imposing application limits that restrict the maximum number
of applications allowed per applicant.
Application limits are considered by Che and Koh (2016), who model a college admissions
game in which colleges manage yield by strategically targeting applicants who are less likely
to receive other offers. Application costs are present in Chade, Lewis and Smith (2014).
More recently, in a model of matching economics PhDs to university positions, Nguyen
et al. (2018) note that a reduced application cost increases the probability of application.
Furthermore, they show that this reduced cost causes an increase in the probability that
offers are turned down by applicants and an increase in the probability that positions remain
unmatched. As a result, some universities’ welfare may decrease.
Application limits are often observed in centralized school choice. Pathak and So¨nmez
(2013) show that more applicants find it profitable to misreport their preferences under
DA-T-K when K decreases. Their study focuses more on a mechanism’s vulnerability to
preference-misreporting, while ours looks at the outcome of a matching market in terms of
congestion and match quality. In a laboratory experiment, Calsamiglia, Haeringer and Klijn
(2010) make K decrease from 7 to 3 in DA-T-K and find that more subjects do not report
their true preferences. There are also more blocking pairs and larger efficiency losses. Our
results on DA-T are consistent with theirs, while we consider a wider range of K in our
counterfactual analysis.
Another way educational institutions mitigate screening costs is to organize entrance
exams. For example, in the 2000s, certain Brazilian universities used a low-cost first-round
exam to screen out applicants who were unlikely to qualify, while a second-round exam,
which was costlier and more informative, refined the selection (Carvalho, Magnac and Xiong,
forthcoming). This two-tier screening device, a centralized exam followed by a costlier
decentralized exam, is also used in Japan (Hafalir, Hakimov, Ku¨bler and Kurino, 2016).
Our paper also sheds light on the design of online platforms, an extensively studied topic
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(Fradkin, 2014; Halaburda, Piskorski and Yildirim, 2015; Horton, 2015). That literature
often shows in different contexts that limiting the number of potential matches might have
desirable properties in terms of aggregate welfare because of decreased screening costs. For
example, in a dynamic search model with costly discovery of match quality, Kanoria and
Saban (2017) find that a platform can mitigate wasteful competition in match-partner search
via restricting what agents can see/do.
Signaling in matching markets also relates to the issues we study (Coles, Kushnir and
Niederle, 2013; Lee and Schwarz, 2017). Programs can target applicants by letting applicants
signal their interests in specific programs. To avoid cheap talk, signals are made costly or
are limited in terms of the total number of signals permitted. This step may improve
welfare in equilibrium because offers are made to applicants who have a higher probability
of accepting the offer (Coles et al., 2013). In decentralized settings, pre-match interviews
can be organized between applicants and programs (Lee and Schwarz, 2017), which are
costly for both sides in terms of application costs and screening costs. Focusing on the
information about their preferences agents need to learn and communicate with others to
form the final matching, Ashlagi, Braverman, Kanoria and Shi (2018) explore signaling and
recommendation protocols with which a market reaches a desirable equilibrium outcome
with a small communication cost.
Our study is also related to the literature on labor markets with costly search (for a
survey, see Rogerson et al., 2005). However, in that setting, decreasing individual search
costs leads to better prospects for programs, while in our setting, decreasing these costs can
be detrimental to program welfare because of screening costs. An exception in this literature
is Seabright and Sen (2015). In their theoretical model, a reduction in application costs can
lower a firm’s payoff, because it attracts lower quality applicants.
In terms of theoretical tools, the two-sided matching framework we study is well analyzed
and summarized in Roth and Sotomayor (1990). More specifically, our model builds on
the theoretical results derived by Haeringer and Klijn (2009) and Fack, Grenet and He
(Forthcoming) in which the equilibrium properties of the DA mechanism with truncation
and/or application costs are investigated.
The estimation of applicant preferences from applicants’ submitted ROLs is an important
building block of our empirical analysis. In a strand of the recent empirical school choice lit-
erature, applicants are assumed to report their true preferences, as in our experiment under
DA. Standard discrete choice methods are extended – e.g., as an exploded logit – to utilize
the identifying information contained in ROLs (Hastings, Kane and Staiger, 2008; Abdulka-
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dirog˘lu, Agarwal and Pathak, 2017; Pathak and Shi, 2017). Another strand of this litera-
ture explicitly considers possible strategic applicant behavior, for example, using data from
the Boston immediate-acceptance mechanism (Agarwal and Somaini, Forthcoming; Cal-
samiglia, Fu and Gu¨ell, 2014; He, 2015; Hwang, 2017) or from DA-T (Ajayi, 2013; Carvalho
et al., forthcoming; Fack et al., Forthcoming). In contrast to our study of both sides’ welfare,
this literature often focuses on student welfare only.
More generally, this paper builds on a growing body of literature in which structural
methods are applied to real-life, experimental data and thus enlarge the span of counterfac-
tual policy analyses (for a survey, see Blundell, 2017).
2 Many-to-one Matching: Set-up
A many-to-one matching market in which applicants are to be matched with programs is
denoted by !
rvi,jsiPI,jPJYt0u , rsi,jsiPIYt0u,jPJ , rqjsjPJ , CA pq , CP pq
)
,
where I  t1, ..., Iu is the set of applicants and J  t1, ..., Ju is the set of programs, with
the addition of 0 as an outside option or the option of being unmatched. Applicant i receives
a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility vi,j P R if matched with j; and vi  pvi,0, vi,1, . . . , vi,Jq.
Programs have responsive preferences, and more specifically, program j values its match
with i at si,j P R regardless of who else is matched with j. Let si  psi,0, . . . , si,Jq. Each
applicant can be matched with at most one program, and each program has a capacity of
qj identical positions. There is no indifference in preferences on either side. Program j is
acceptable to i if vi,j ¥ vi,0, and otherwise, it is unacceptable. Program j finds applicant to
be qualified if si,j ¥ s0,j; otherwise, i is unqualified for j. Moreover, applicant i is qualified
for program j if and only if i meets j’s prerequisites.
Deviating from the previous literature, we assume that it is costly for an applicant to
“apply” to programs, CA pq ¥ 0, while every program has to conduct a costly screening of
its candidates to form its preferences, CP pq ¥ 0. Both cost functions, which are defined
below, are homogeneous across i and j, respectively.
We consider a centralized market. Programs first announce their capacities and prereq-
uisites, and every applicant then submits a rank-ordered list (ROL) of Ki ¤ J programs,
denoted by Li 
 




, where lki P J is i’s kth choice. An ROL defines a relationship
¡Li such that j ¡Li j
1 if and only if j is ranked above j1 in Li. The set of all possible ROLs,
L, includes all ROLs that rank at least one program. We define program j’s candidates as
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the set of applicants who include program j in their submitted ROLs.
Application cost and screening cost. When submitting ROL L, an applicant incurs
a cost that is assumed to depend on the number of programs being ranked in L, denoted
by |L|, but not on how they are ranked, CA p|L|q : t0, . . . , Ju Ñ R
 
 r0, 8s. Similarly,
upon receiving an application, a program pays a screening cost to learn its value of being
matched with the applicant. The total screening cost of forming preferences over the (subset
of) candidates Ij is CP p|Ij|q : t0, . . . , Iu Ñ R . For simplicity, we assume that a program
always pays the cost of forming preferences over all its candidates. In other words, programs
do not strategically choose to remain uninformed about their preferences over (a subset of)
its candidates. Moreover, as we shall see in Section 4.4, programs in centralized markets
are often prohibited from using information on candidates’ ROLs to screen them, while in
decentralized markets, applicants do not disclose their ROLs to any party.
Both the application cost and the screening cost monotonically increase such that for all
n ¥ 0, CA pn  1q ¥ CA pnq and CP pn  1q ¥ CP pnq. These specifications are rather flexi-
ble, and in particular, such application cost captures many common practices of matching
markets, as we show shortly.
2.1 Matching and Matching Mechanisms
We define a matching µ : I Ñ J Y t0u such that (i) µ piq  j if applicant i is matched with
j; (ii) µ piq  0 if applicant i is unmatched; and (iii) µ1pjq is the set of applicants matched
with j, while |µ1pjq| is the number of applicants matched with j and does not exceed j’s
capacity.
A matching µ is individually rational if each applicant prefers her current match to
remaining unmatched and if each program prefers each of its currently matched applicants
to having a vacant position. Given matching µ, pi, jq form a blocking pair if i prefers j
over her matched program µpiq, while i is preferred by j to either having a vacant position
or keeping the least-preferred applicant of the currently matched ones. µ is stable if there
is no blocking pair and if it is individually rational. Stability implies Pareto efficiency when
both sides have strict preferences,2 and stability is essential to the success of many matching
2Abdulkadiroglu and So¨nmez (2013) show this result for one-to-one matching, and we can extend it to
many-to-one matching with responsive preferences. Suppose that µ1 Pareto dominates a stable matching
µ. There must exist a program or an applicant who is strictly better off in µ1. Begin by assuming that
applicant i strictly prefers µ1piq to µpiq. Because µ is stable and because program preferences are strict,
program µ1piq must be strictly worse off in matching µ1 than in matching µ; otherwise, i and µ1piq could
form a blocking pair in µ. This situation contradicts the Pareto domination presumption. We would reach
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markets (Roth, 1991).
Deferred Acceptance and its variants. The applicant-program match is solved by a
mechanism. As a computerized algorithm, the applicant-proposing DA works as follows:
Round 1. Every applicant applies to the first choice listed in her ROL. Each program
rejects unqualified applicants and the least-preferred applicants in excess of its capacity and
tentatively holds the other applicants.
Generally, later rounds are described as follows:
Round k. Every applicant who is rejected in Round pk  1q applies to the next choice on
her ROL. Each program, pooling new applicants and those who were held in Round pk  1q,
rejects unqualified applicants and the least preferred applicants in excess of its capacity.
Those who are not rejected are tentatively held by the programs.
The process ends after the round in which rejections are no longer issued. Each program
is then matched with the applicants it is currently holding.
The three variants of DA that we consider differ only in their application costs. In the
traditional DA mechanism, denoted by DA, the application cost is always zero: Cp|L|q  0
for all L P L. The DA with truncation, denoted by DA-T, does not allow applicants to
apply to more than K P t1, . . . , Ju programs, which is defined as DA-T of degree K and
denoted by DA-T-K. Therefore, C p|L|q  0 whenever |L| ¤ K; otherwise, C p|L|q   8.
The last is DA with costs, denoted by DA-C, under which applicants must pay a cost for
each program beyond their top K choices. In this case, C p|L|q  cp|L|Kq1p|L| ¡ Kq
if the marginal cost of application beyond K is c, a positive constant.
2.2 Timeline, Information, Strategy, and Equilibrium Concept
We consider a matching game with incomplete information and a timeline depicted in Fig-
ure 1. First, at the “announcement” stage, a mechanism is chosen and made public to both
programs and applicants; in addition, programs reveal their capacities and prerequisites.
Prerequisites define the necessary and sufficient conditions for qualification.
Second, at the “application” stage, applicant preferences (vi) are private information,
while the distribution of applicant preferences – conditional on some common-knowledge
applicant characteristics (denoted by X  rxisiPI) – is common knowledge. For example, X
includes information previously announced by programs.
the same contradiction had we begun by assuming that there exists program j that strictly prefers µ11pjq
to µ1pjq. Therefore, the stable matching µ is Pareto efficient.
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ANNOUNCEMENT
The mechanism is chosen and
made public. Each program
truthfully announces its capacity
and prerequisites.
APPLICATION
With common knowledge X and
private information vi, applicant i
submits an ROL under uncertainty
about (i) other applicants’ prefer-
ences & (ii) program preferences.
MORE INFORMATION
More information about applicants
(Z) becomes available to pro-
grams. In our setting, programs
learn applicants’ final grades.
SCREENING
With all available information
(X,Z), each program screens
and ranks all its candidates.
Program preferences are submit-
ted to the mechanism.
MATCHING
The matching mechanism
uses submitted ROLs and
program preferences to
solve the matching.
Figure 1: Timeline of the Matching Game under a Given Mechanism
After applications are submitted in the form of ROLs, more information about applicants,
denoted by Z, can become available to programs. In our experiment, applicants’ final grades
are realized and learned by programs after applicants have submitted their ROLs.3 With
information on pX,Zq, a program always behaves truthfully at the “screening” stage, in
which it screens all its candidates who, as defined above, are the applicants including it in
their ROLs. Each program then submits its preferences over its candidates.
Finally, at the “matching” stage, the mechanism finds a matching by considering sub-
missions from both sides.
Strategies and equilibrium. The following assumption is imposed on programs’ behav-
ior. As we shall see in Section 3, this assumption is plausible in our experiment.
Assumption 1 Programs do not behave strategically in the following sense: (i) Each pro-
gram truthfully reports its capacity and prerequisites, (ii) screens all its candidates, and (iii)
reports to the mechanism its true preference ranking over all its candidates.
To mitigate the issue of multiple equilibria, we also impose several assumptions on ap-
plicant strategy as an equilibrium refinement.
Assumption 2 Applicants do not apply to any unacceptable program or to any program for
which they are not qualified.
Because applicants always have access to their outside options, the marginal benefit of
applying to unacceptable programs is zero; similarly, applying to a program for which an
applicant does not qualify or meet the prerequisites brings zero payoff because the program
will never accept an unqualified applicant. Assumption 2 therefore regulates how applicants
3It is important however to ensure that when they screen candidates, programs are not informed of actual
ROLs or any signal thereof.
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behave when they have multiple best responses and is binding only when the marginal
application cost is zero. With this assumption, we may possibly underestimate congestion in
markets without application cost, because applicants may apply to unacceptable programs
in real life (see, e.g., He, 2015). As a result, our estimated effect of application costs on
congestion is likely to be a lower bound.
We focus on symmetric pure strategies such that σpvi, xi, Xq : RJ 1R|xi|RI|xi| Ñ Li,
where xi is i’s characteristics/information that are common knowledge and Li  L are all
the ROLs consistent with Assumption 2. When playing the game, an applicant’s beliefs are
equated with her probability of acceptance by each program and depend on her information
set. The probability that applicant i is accepted by program j when submitting list Li
is denoted by pijpLi|X, σq, which is conditional on common knowledge X and on others’
strategy σ. A Bayesian Nash equilibrium is σ such that for all pvi, xi, Xq,




pijpσpvi, xi, Xq|X, σ
qmaxpvi,j, vi,0q  CAp|σpvi, xi, Xq|q,
where pijp|X, σ
q is the probability of acceptance by program j consistent with σ. In
other words, given that everyone plays strategy σ, when i submits a list L, the probability
that i is accepted by j is exactly pijpL|X, σ
q. Furthermore, only maxpvi,j, vi,0q matters
in utility terms because i can always take the outside option whenever matched with an
unacceptable program. The existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in pure strategies can
be established by applying Theorem 4 in Milgrom and Weber (1985). Moreover, we can
solve for equilibrium, and thus pijp|X, σ
q, following the steps in Appendix D.1.
Before discussing equilibrium properties, we introduce the following assumption.
Assumption 3 Equilibrium acceptance probabilities are non-degenerate for qualified appli-
cants: pijpL|X, σ
q P p0, 1q for every j P L and for all i and L P Li.
In other words, there is sufficient uncertainty in other applicants’ preferences and in
program preferences such that every applicant has some chance of being accepted by any
program to which she applies as long as she meets the prerequisites. This assumption is
satisfied in our econometric model because we assume that both applicant and program
preferences (vi, si) have full support on the real line (see Section 5).
Given Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, the literature provides the following results:
(i) Under DA, i.e., CAp|L|q  0 for all L, there is a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium
in which every applicant truthfully ranks all of the acceptable programs for which she
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qualifies (Dubins and Freedman, 1981; Roth, 1982). The equilibrium outcome is the
applicant-optimal stable matching that Pareto dominates all other stable matchings in
terms of applicant welfare (Gale and Shapley, 1962).
(ii) Under DA-T-K for K P t1, . . . , Ju, it is a dominated strategy if one submits ROL L
that does not truthfully rank programs included in L (Haeringer and Klijn, 2009). An
equilibrium matching outcome is not necessarily stable; for any applicant-program pair
pi, jq, the probability of pi, jq forming a blocking pair is bounded above by a function
that is decreasing in K and equal to zero when K  J (Fack et al., Forthcoming).
(iii) Under DA-C, it is a dominated strategy if one submits ROL L that does not truthfully
rank programs included in L. An equilibrium matching outcome is not necessarily
stable; in the case of a constant marginal cost (c), for any applicant-program pair
pi, jq, the probability that pi, jq forms a blocking pair is bounded above by a function
that is increasing in c and equal to zero when c  0 (Fack et al., Forthcoming).
We use these results to guide our experimental and research design and, in particular,
the mechanisms considered in counterfactual analysis.
2.3 Evaluation Criteria
Our analysis evaluates the performance of a market design with five criteria. The first is
about congestion or screening cost, while the last four are about match quality.
(i) Congestion/screening costs: Recall that by assumption, every program screens
all its candidates. In the absence of direct information on screening technology, we
measure a program’s screen costs by the number of applications it receives (and thus
screens).
(ii) Stability (number of blocking pairs): In two-sided matching, both sides’ welfare
matter. Stability is therefore a natural welfare criterion.4 Although finding all block-
ing pairs unrealistically requires that every applicant and program know everyone’s
preferences, we use this concept in the sense that no blocking pair implies Pareto ef-
ficiency when both sides have strict preferences. Moreover, blocking pairs may affect
the survival of a market design in the future, because such pairs can sometimes be
identified and thus reveal some drawbacks of the existing design.
4In contrast, the recent literature on school choice is mostly interested in the welfare of one side, students
(see, for a survey, Pathak, 2011). In that setting, schools are passive and only endowed with priorities instead
of preferences.
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(iii) Number of unmatched applicants: An extreme form of match inefficiency is some
applicants being unmatched, especially when everyone can be matched. Indeed, our
setting is such a matching market, as we shall see shortly. The number of unmatched
applicants therefore provides a measure of match quality.
(iv) Applicant welfare: We evaluate applicant welfare both ordinally and cardinally. The
ordinal measure uses the applicants’ true ordinal preferences revealed under DA, while
the cardinal measure relies on an estimation of cardinal preferences. An advantage of
the cardinal measure is that we can explicitly consider application costs and measure
applicant welfare net of costs.
(v) Program welfare: Measuring program welfare over their assigned applicants is more
demanding. In the data, we observe program ordinal preferences over individual ap-
plicants; even with this information and assuming responsive program preferences,
we may still fail to construct program preferences over sets of applicants. We report
program ordinal preferences whenever the comparison is conclusive. In addition, we
construct two approximations to cardinal preferences – one based on applicants’ grades,
the other using program ordinal preferences.
3 Experiment at the Toulouse School of Economics
3.1 Background and Experimental Design
TSE organizes its master’s programs into two years of study, M1 and M2. In the first year,
it admits approximately 150 students, who are placed into three M1 programs: Law and
economics, statistics and econometrics, and economics. M1 students are allowed to apply
to the seven M2 programs for their second year of study. The names of the programs,
which indicate their differentiated foci, are described in Table 1. In the rest of the paper,
the programs are randomly ordered and labeled as P1 to P7. Our study focuses on the
matching between applicants and programs.
In partnership with the TSE administration, we conducted an experiment in May 2013
aimed at improving the market design for the applicant-program match. Previously, for
example, in 2011 and 2012, the match was organized in a semi-centralized but rather ad-hoc
fashion. Applicants submitted two ranked choices without being provided explicit guide-
lines on how these two choices would be used. Given applicants’ choices and academic files,
the program directors met to decide who could be matched with which program. During
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Table 1: Program Names and Prerequisites
Program Acronym Prerequisites Program Name in English (French)
ECL Yes Economics and Competition Law
(Economie et Droit de la Concurrence)
EMO No Economics of Markets and Organizations
(Economie des Marche´s et des Organisations)
ERNA No Environmental and Natural Resources Economics
(Economie de l’environnement et des ressources naturelles)
ETE No Economic Theory and Econometrics – PhD Track
(Economie Mathe´matique et Econome´trie)
MIF No Financial Markets and Intermediaries
(Marche´s et Interme´diaires Financiers)
PPD No Development Economics and Public Policies
(Politique Publique et De´veloppement)
STA Yes Statistics and Econometrics
(Statistique et Econome´trie)
Notes: The programs are listed in alphabetical order, according to their acronyms. This order does not correspond to P1-P7.
The prerequisites for Program STA include some courses in statistics and econometrics; those for Program ECL include certain
courses in law.
the meeting (and sometimes multiple meetings), each program director screened its candi-
dates and decided whether to accept them. Because every applicant was guaranteed the
opportunity to continue his/her study at TSE, the costliest part of this process was finding
solutions for applicants who were ranked low and were rejected by their two choices. As its
main disadvantages, this market design was time-consuming for the program directors and
even created adversarial relationships among some of them.
In our experiment, the “subjects” come from two sides of the matching market in 2013:
The seven M2 programs, which are represented by their directors, and the 129 applicants
who were finishing their M1 study at TSE and were applying for admission to TSE’s M2
programs. As depicted in Figure 2, the matching game in the experiment is played in five
stages:
ANNOUNCEMENT
The four matching mecha-
nisms are made public. Each
program announces its capacity
and prerequisites.
APPLICATION
Applicant i submits four






Independent of the mechanisms,
we send to each program the list of its
candidates, preselecting a subset of them
for screening. Each program screens its
candidates and send us its preferences.
MATCHING
Each mechanism uses the program pref-
erences and the corresponding submit-
ted ROLs to output a matching. The
four matching outcomes are submitted
to the TSE administration.
Figure 2: Timeline of Matching Applicants with M2 Programs at TSE in the Experiment
(i) Announcement: The programs announce their capacity and prerequisites (in terms
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of courses that an applicant must have taken during M1 study). Only two programs
have such prerequisites. The programs also disclose that an applicant’s final grade –
a weighted average of all courses taken during the academic year – will be used in the
screening process. Applicants are informed that one of the three aforementioned mech-
anisms (DA, DA-T, and DA-C) and the Immediate Acceptance (IA) will be chosen to
match applicants with programs.5 The version of DA-T is DA-T-4; under the designed
DA-C, applicants can freely rank their top-3 choices and must write a motivation let-
ter for each additional choice. That is, the marginal application cost is in the form of
writing a motivation letter.
(ii) Application: Under each mechanism, applicants submit an ROL on an official uni-
versity website that is also used for all coursework.
(iii) More Information. After applicants submit their ROLs, they take their final exams
and obtain their final grades, which are weighted averages of all courses taken during
the academic year.
(iv) Screening. To each program, we send a list of the applicants who have included the
program in at least one of her four submitted ROLs. We also attach the information
on their final grades and their grades for each individual course, but we do not inform
the programs about how each applicant ranks them or the motivation letters that may
have been written under DA-C. To save the programs screening costs and convince
them that engaging in the experiment is not too costly for them, we, as the market
designer and the clearinghouse, pre-select a subset of the program’s candidates for
screening. Meanwhile, the program directors are explicitly encouraged to screen all
applicants. The programs then rank applicants and send us their rankings.
(v) Matching. After receiving the programs’ rankings over applicants, we calculate the
matching under each of the four mechanisms and send the outcomes to the adminis-
tration. The TSE administration chooses one of the four matchings to be implemented
(which happens to be the one from DA).
The above information and the instructions of the experiment are all explained on the
application website, and we provide screenshots in Appendix A.
5The Immediate Acceptance mechanism, also known as the Boston mechanism, is sometimes used for
school choice in practice. The definition of the mechanism is given in Appendix A.1. Although also being
included in the experiment that we conduct, this mechanism is not the focus of the current study. We
therefore do not present the results of this mechanism.
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Applicant incentives in the experiment. It is announced that one of the mechanisms
will be chosen for the final matching, so the applicants have incentives to behave under
each mechanism as if that mechanism is implemented.6 That is, under each mechanism,
it is in applicants’ best interest to behave optimally as if that mechanism were actually
implemented. On the website, we also make this point explicit (see the screenshots in
Figures E.1–E.5 in Appendix E).
One may be concerned that, under DA-C, applicants must pay the cost before knowing
if the mechanism will be chosen. In other words, the return to writing a motivation let-
ter is discounted by the probability that DA-C is chosen, which amounts to inflating the
application cost. In any case, the application costs under DA-C remain subjective.
Information on the mechanisms. We provide applicants with definitions of the mech-
anisms and explicit tips on how to play the game under each mechanism. Under DA, we
emphasize that truth-telling, i.e., ranking programs according to their true preferences, is a
dominant strategy. Under DA-T-4 and DA-C, it is noted that while truth-telling is no longer
a dominant strategy, it is still in the applicants’ best interest to order the ranked programs
truthfully (Haeringer and Klijn, 2009). The screenshots in Appendix E (Figures E.1–E.5)
show what applicants could see on the website.
Information to the directors. When screening applicants, the directors are not informed
about the submitted ROLs or any signals thereof or which mechanism will be chosen. This
makes it more plausible that they behave truthfully and that Assumption 1 is satisfied.
Screening cost depends on whether the programs can screen applicants round by round,
and crucially, this possibility relies on how programs can use information about applicants’
submitted ROLs. For various reasons, some programs may prefer to take into account the
applicants’ preferences or their ROLs when screening them. This would, however, create
incentive problems for the applicants. To preserve the strategy-proofness of DA, it is usually
required that applicants’ ROLs are not seen by the programs. For example, the National
Resident Matching Program (NRMP) – the clearinghouse that matches medical residents
6When implementing the experiment, no one in any party involved in the experiment (including the
experimenters, the TSE administration, the program directors, and the applicants) had a clear prediction
on which mechanism would be chosen. Although the TSE administration had the final say, the choice
could be influenced by various factors. In particular, the program directors, with opposing objectives,
could lobby or protest. Besides, the administration would also be choosing a mechanism for the future.
Our understanding of the objectives of the TSE administration is that both match quality and screening
cost were important. These ex-ante considerations convinced us to state the following in the experiment
instructions “to the best of our knowledge, we believe that every mechanism has an almost equal probability
to be chosen.” See Figures E.1 in Appendix E for a screenshot of the instructions.
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with hospitals – states that “[y]our rank order list is confidential and never will be shared
with the programs.” One way to keep ROLs confidential is to ask the programs to screen the
applicants all at once before running the mechanisms, which is the practice in, for example,
university admissions in Germany and Victoria, Australia and the NRMP, where certain
variants of DA are used.
To reduce screening costs and to make this experiment feasible, we use applicants’ sub-
mitted ROLs to identify a subset of applicants over whom the program’s strict preferences
are required to calculate the matching. It should be emphasized that the applicants are not
informed of this pre-selection at any stage. It is therefore impossible that their behavior is
affected by this practice. Moreover, every program is encouraged to screen everyone. When
the mechanisms were actually run, no program had to accept or reject an applicant who was
not pre-selected for that program. More details are provided in Appendix A.3.
Randomized orders of programs and mechanisms. To prevent potential framing
effects, we randomly assign the 129 applicants into 7 groups, each of which has a unique
order of programs presented on the website. Each of the 7 programs is presented as the first
to a unique group of applicants and presented as the last to another. Moreover, applicants
in a given group play the four mechanisms in one of the following four sequences (DA, DA-
T-4, DA-C, IA), (DA, DA-C, DA-T-4, IA), (IA, DA, DA-T-4, DA-C), and (IA, DA, DA-C,
DA-T-4). We decide to have DA-T-4 and DA-C immediately follow DA in order to avoid
potential confusion about the mechanisms.
3.2 Length of ROL and Unacceptable Programs
In the experiment, applicants are required to rank all 7 programs under DA, 4 programs
under DA-T, and at least 3 programs under DA-C, as the web design makes it cumbersome
to allow applicants to rank a flexible number of programs. To alleviate this constraint, we
also elicit information from every applicant on whether a program is acceptable to him/her.
When evaluating the programs’ screening costs, we assume that applicants never apply to
unacceptable programs (Assumption 2).
Before beginning the application process, every applicant must answer the following
question for each program:
“If you are accepted (and only accepted) by program name, will you stay at
TSE and register for the program in September 2013?”
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In the survey, “program name” is replaced by the full name of one of the seven programs.
An applicant must tick one of the three possible answers, “Yes,” “No,” and “I Don’t Know.”
We relabel these responses as “definitely acceptable,” “unacceptable,” and “possibly accept-
able”, respectively, whereby a possibly acceptable program is less preferred than a definitely
acceptable one but more preferred than an unacceptable one. The same question is repeated
for all seven programs, and we clarify that this information is not used in the actual match-
ing process, although we use it in this research. In the following, we sometimes refer to the
“definitely acceptable” and “possibly acceptable” categories collectively as “acceptable”.
The responses to these questions are summarized in Table 2. Two findings stand out
from the table, which shows the heterogeneity of applicant preferences: Program P4 is
definitely acceptable to 81% of the applicants and unacceptable to only 7% of them; in
contrast, program P6, which is more specialized and has prerequisites, is unacceptable to
the majority of applicants (78%).
Table 2: How the Applicants Consider the Programs: Percentages
Program Unacceptable Possibly Acceptable Definitely Acceptable
P1 22 10 67
(3.63) (2.62) (4.06)
P2 29 19 53
(3.98) (3.43) (4.39)
P3 38 18 44
(4.30) (3.34) (4.40)
P4 7 12 81
(2.23) (2.89) (3.46)
P5 33 24 43
(4.15) (3.74) (4.38)
P6 78 7 16
(3.69) (2.26) (3.17)
P7 40 18 43
(4.27) (3.34) (4.30)
Notes: This table shows the percentages of 129 applicants who consider each program as “unacceptable,” “possibly acceptable,”
and “definitely acceptable”. The results are calculated from the applicants’ responses to survey questions that are not used in
the actual matching process. Bootstrap standard errors from 10, 000 samples are in parentheses.
When assuming that applicants do not apply to unacceptable programs, we notice that
one applicant is matched with an unacceptable program under all mechanisms (and is en-
rolled in this program in September 2013). Since dropping the applicant’s unacceptable
programs from his/her ROLs would change the matching outcome under every mechanism,
we instead re-categorize the program to be “possibly acceptable” to this applicant. Fur-
thermore, there are 9 applicants whose ROLs under DA are not consistent with the survey
responses, provided that they report true preferences under DA. For example, one ranks
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an unacceptable program before a possibly acceptable one. For these applicants, we up-
date some of the programs’ acceptability to restore consistency. More details on this data
cleaning are available in Appendix B.
4 Experimental Data and Direct Evaluation
In addition to observing applicant behaviors in the experiment, we also collect administra-
tive data on applicants’ grades from M1 courses (from the first semester and from both
semesters), demographic information, and scholarship status. The key variables are sum-
marized in Table 3.
Table 3: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max
M1 Grades: First semester 11.66 2.21 6.01 17.40
M1 Grades: Final (2 semesters) 12.27 2.04 8.02 17.68
Age 24.47 1.73 20.96 33.57
M1 Program: Economics 0.57 0.50 0 1
M1 Program: Statistics 0.34 0.48 0 1
Female 0.45 0.50 0 1
Scholarship 0.28 0.45 0 1
Notes: In total, there are 129 observations. Scholarship equals one if the applicant holds a scholarship from TSE or from the
French government. Out of a total of 20 points, the grades are the credit-weighted average of grades from the courses taken
during their first-semester or two-semester M1 study.
We now turn to applicant strategies and outcomes under each mechanism. As discussed
in Section 2.3, we focus on two types of measures, match quality and screening cost. The
first type includes stability, unmatched applicants, applicant welfare, and program welfare.
Screening cost, or congestion, is measured by the number of candidates to be screened.
Under the assumption that applicants report truthfully under DA, we take applicants’
reported ROLs under DA as their true ordinal preferences. There is a recent literature
documenting that some applicants do not report truthfully under DA (e.g., Hassidim, Romm
and Shorrer, 2016; Artemov, Che and He, 2017; Shorrer and So´va´go´, 2017). The truth-telling
assumption is plausible in our setting for the following reasons: (i) On the experiment
website, we explicitly announce that truth-telling under DA is in their best interest (see the
screen shots in Figure E.3), and provide the details of the algorithm as well as an example
on a linked help page; together with the fact that our applicants are graduate students
in economics and have a few weeks to make a decision, it is plausible that the applicants
understand/believe the strategy-proofness of DA. (ii) In contrast to other settings, our
applicants do rank all programs. (iii) Comparing their submitted ROLs under DA with the
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survey responses on program acceptability, we identify only 9 instances of inconsistency,
among which 8 involves the response “I don’t know” (see Appendix B).
In this section, we do not make further assumptions on applicants’ strategies under DA-
T-4 or DA-C and instead evaluate what is observed. Recall that we assume that applicants
do not apply to the programs that are deemed unacceptable or for which they do not meet
the prerequisites. Therefore, we remove these programs from the ROLs when analyzing
congestion. This removal does not affect the matching outcome in the data and therefore
mitigates market congestion only, especially for DA (without cost).
4.1 Statistical Inference
The focus of the study is the matching game consisting of agents on both sides, applicants
and programs. Therefore, in an ideal experiment, we would have the same game indepen-
dently played multiple times by different sets of agents under different mechanisms. In other
words, the unit of observation in the experiment is a game play or a matching market. How-
ever, our data contain outcomes from only one market under several mechanisms. Thus,
careful consideration is necessary when making statistical inferences.
This leads us to resampling (or bootstrapping): We randomly resample applicants with
replacement; the size of the resample is equal to the size of the original dataset; and in
each resample, the programs are always kept the same. Implicitly, we assume that the
empirical distribution of applications (types and strategies) is a good approximation of the
theoretical distribution; by drawing from the empirical distribution independently, we create
an independent play of the same game in each resample. In a given resample, multiple
observations may originate from the same applicant in the original data; when programs
rank the applicants, the ties among them are broken randomly.7 Standard errors and testing
results in this section are based on 10, 000 resamples.
This resampling procedure is justified for standard statistics but not for extremal statis-
tics. This literature is reviewed in Bickel and Sakov (2008) who also propose another re-
sampling procedure in these non-standard cases. We leave them for further research given
the small size of our sample.
7We use a lottery to break ties for each program. Because ties involve the same applicant being sampled
multiple times in a resample, how ties are broken does not affect our outcome. Relatedly, because some
variables, X, are assumed to be common knowledge among all applicants, re-sampling should be conditional
on X. As this would deflate standard errors and potentially lead to small sample issues, we present the
results from random resampling which would tend to be conservative.
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4.2 Applicant Strategies
Table 4 presents the distribution of the number of programs ranked under each mechanism.
By imposing a cost, both DA-T-4 and DA-C discourage the applicants from ranking too
many programs. As a result, every applicant ranks 0.7 (0.9) programs fewer on average under
DA-T-4 (DA-C) than under DA. The differences between these numbers of applications are
all statistically significant (p-value   0.01), as is the difference between DA-T-4 and DA-C
(p-value   0.05).
Table 4: Number of Programs Ranked by Applicants (in percentages)
Mechanism
# of programs ranked Average number of
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 programs rankeda
DA 4 10 17 26 28 15 0 4.09
(1.69) (2.62) (3.31) (3.87) (3.95) (3.14) - (0.12)
DA-T-4 4 11 29 57 - - - 3.38
(1.69) (2.70) (3.98) (4.34) - - - (0.07)
DA-C 5 14 56 12 9 5 0 3.21
(1.84) (3.02) (4.42) (2.87) (2.54) (1.85) - (0.10)
Notes: This table shows the distribution of the numbers of programs in the submitted ROLs under each mechanism. Each
number – except those in the last column – represents the percentages of the applicants who rank that many programs in their
ROLs. We remove from the ROLs the unacceptable programs and those for which the applicant is not qualified. Bootstrap
standard errors from 10, 000 samples are in parentheses. a From t-tests, the differences in the numbers of applications under
DA, DA-T-4, and DA-C are all statistically significant (p-value   0.05). Specifically, the difference is 0.71 (s.e. 0.07) between
DA and DA-T-4, 0.88 (s.e. 0.09) between DA and DA-C, and 0.17 (s.e. 0.07) between DA-T-4 and DA-C.
DA-T-4 allows applicants to freely rank four programs, and therefore, the mode of the
number of ranked programs is four, accounting for 57 percent of the applicants. Moreover,
22 percent of them do not adopt a “truncation” strategy; that is, these applicants’ submitted
ROLs do not coincide with the top portion of their true ordinal preferences. Under DA-C,
this statistic is 7 percent.
Recall that it is free to rank the first three programs under DA-C, while the applicant
has to pay a cost by writing a motivation letter for each of the fourth to seventh choices.
Unsurprisingly, the mode is three; however, 26 percent of the applicants choose to pay some
costs and rank more than three programs.
4.3 Match Quality
Applicants’ submitted ROLs and programs’ rankings over applicants allow us to calculate the
matching outcome under each mechanism. Table 5 reports the number of matched applicants
by program and mechanism. Programs P5-P7 do not meet their capacities mainly because
the total capacity (142) exceeds the total number of applicants (129). Only under DA-C is
an applicant unmatched.
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P1 14 14 14 14
(0.06) (0.12) (0.06)
P2 22 22 22 22
(1.30) (1.28) (1.48)
P3 22 22 22 22
(2.30) (2.01) (2.00)
P4 28 28 28 28
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
P5 22 12 12 11
(3.08) (3.21) (3.09)
P6 12 10 10 10
(2.31) (2.31) (2.31)
P7 22 21 21 21
(2.07) (2.15) (2.35)
Total Unmatched 0 0 1
(1.27) (1.90) (1.99)
Notes: This table shows the number of applicants matched with each program under each mechanism. The total capacity is
142. Three programs, P5-P7, do not meet their capacities. Bootstrap standard errors from 10, 000 samples are in parentheses.
In terms of applicant welfare, 85 percent of the applicants are assigned to their most
preferred program, as shown in Table 6. DA and DA-T-4 perform equally well on this
dimension, while DA-C performs worse due to the applicant left unmatched with this mech-
anism. The ordinal welfare distribution barely varies across the 10, 000 resamples under
either mechanism. These statistics imply that applicant preferences are sufficiently hetero-
geneous. One would expect that in such a market, congestion should be less of a concern.
Yet, as we shall see in Section 4.4, program screen costs can still be significantly lowered
without harming match quality.
Table 6: Ordinal Welfare of the Applicants under Each Mechanism
Fraction of Applicants Matched with
Unmatched
Most Preferred 2nd Preferred 3rd Preferred 4th Preferred
DA 85 10 4 1 0
DA-T-4 85 10 4 1 0
DA-C 85 10 4 0 1
Notes: This table shows the numbers of applicants matched with their most preferred program, second most preferred one,
etc., under each mechanism. The applicants’ true ordinal preferences are what they reveal under DA. No applicant is matched
with his/her 5th or less preferred program. Bootstrap standard errors from 10, 000 samples are not reported, but are all less
than 0.05.
Table 7 further investigates individual matches. The left side of the table reports the
frequency of blocking pairs under the two mechanisms. DA-T-4 leads to one blocking pair
only, and DA-C results in two blocking pairs formed by two applicants and two programs.
Furthermore, we investigate individual welfare across mechanisms. The middle part of
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Table 7: Deviation from the Optimal Stable Matching under Each Mechanism
Mechanism
Blocking Pairs App. w/ Diff. Match Prog. w/ Diff. Match
#pairs #app. #prog. Total Worse off Better off Total Worse offa Better offa
DA-T-4 1 1 1 3 2 1 3 2 1
(1.87) (1.73) (0.85) (3.36) (2.24) (1.45) (1.74)
DA-C 2 2 2 4 3 1 4 3 1
(2.64) (1.92) (1.07) (3.41) (2.32) (1.46) (1.62)
Notes: This table shows how the matching outcome under each mechanism is different from the applicant-optimal stable
matching (i.e., the DA outcome). There are 129 applicants in total. Blocking pairs are defined with respect to applicants’ true
preferences revealed under DA. Bootstrap standard errors from 10, 000 samples are in parentheses. a Standard errors are not
calculated for these two statistics because a program’s welfare change cannot always be labelled as better off or worse off in
every bootstrap sample (although it is feasible in the experimental data). Recall that a program is better off if all the matched
applicants are (weakly) better than those matched in the old matching.
Table 7 compares the matchings from DA-T-4 and DA-C to that from DA. DA gives us
the applicant-optimal stable matching, which also happens to coincide with the program-
optimal matching in our data. DA-T-4 and DA-C lead to 3 and 4 applicants having different
outcomes, respectively. Moreover, the number of applicants who are worse off is greater than
the number of those who are better off.
The right side of Table 7 shows the number of programs that have different matching
outcomes under DA-T-4/DA-C relative to DA. 3 (4) programs’ outcomes are affected by
DA-T-4 (DA-C), and more programs are worse off than better off under DA-T-4/DA-C.8
In summary, both applicant welfare and program welfare differ across the mechanisms,
but the magnitude is small or even negligible. However, as we emphasize, programs’ screen-
ing cost is another important factor, and we now investigate the screening costs that pro-
grams must pay under each mechanism.
4.4 Programs’ Screening Costs
Recall that each program screens its candidates all at once and that we make no assumptions
about screening cost except that it strictly increases with the number of candidates to be
screened (see Section 2 for more details). Given these assumptions, Table 8 shows, on aver-
age, how many candidates a program screens under each mechanism or, equivalently, how
many applicants include a given program in their submitted ROLs under each mechanism.
When the application cost increases from DA to DA-T-4 (DA-C), the number decreases
from 75 to 62 (59), while the differences are all significant at the 2% level based on t-tests.
We further normalize each program’s screening cost by its capacity. Figure 3 shows
8Given two matchings, µ and µ1, program j is better off if the newly matched applicants, µ11pjqzpµ1pjqX
µ11pjqq, dominate the displaced applicants, µ1pjqzpµ1pjqXµ11pjqq, i.e., element-wise µ11pjqzpµ1pjqX
µ11pjqq ¡j µ
1pjqzpµ1pjqXµ11pjqq when the matched applicants in these two sets are ordered according
to j’s ordinal preferences, ¡j .
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Table 8: Summary Statistics: Number of Candidates to Be Screened
mean s.d. min max
DA 75.29 37.39 11 120
DA-T-4 62.29 33.97 11 117
DA-C 59.14 31.14 11 107
Notes: Each row of this table shows the summary statistics of the number of candidates to be screened across the seven
programs in the experimental data. In other words, these statistics are not based on resampling. Treating each program under
a given mechanism as an observation (and not using resampling), t-tests show that the difference between any two mechanisms
is significant at the 2% level.
the number of candidates per opening (i.e., per available seat) to be screened by each
program under each mechanism. Again, the screening cost is negatively correlated with
the application cost. Under DA, a program has to screen 3.69 candidates per opening on
average. DA-T-4 reduces the cost by approximately 0.65 candidate per opening; DA-C is
even more effective. Moreover, when moving from DA-T-4 to DA-C, this reduction occurs

























#Candidates Screened  
per opening
Figure 3: Number of Candidates Screened by Each Program per Opening
Notes: This figure shows the total number of candidates screened by each program per opening under each mechanism.
Programs must screen all their candidates at once before the mechanism is implemented. The average number of candidates
screened across the seven programs is 3.69 under DA 3.04 under DA-T-4, and 2.90 under DA-C. The error bars indicate the
90% confidence intervals from 10, 000 bootstrap samples.
In conclusion, among the three mechanisms, the increases in application cost does not
significantly affect match quality but greatly reduces programs’ screening costs.
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5 Evaluation Based on Structural Estimation
The set of market designs that we can directly evaluate is necessarily restricted because
we implement only one instance of DA-T and one instance of DA-C in the experiment.
In order to draw a complete picture of the trade-offs between screening costs and match
quality, we would like to evaluate many other market designs with different parameters gov-
erning truncation and application costs. Building on the rich information on both programs
and applicants we observe, this section implements a structural estimation and conducts
evaluations using counterfactual analysis.
To achieve this goal, our structural estimation contains several stages. When DA is
replaced by DA-T or DA-C, an applicant’s optimal strategy is no longer truthful reporting,
and instead, it depends on other applicants’ actions. Recovering the cardinal preferences of
all agents becomes necessary. First, we use experimental data to estimate applicants’ cardi-
nal preferences. In particular, we combine applicants’ submitted ROLs under DA with the
survey data on program acceptability; we also make use of the fact that truthfully ranking
acceptable, qualified programs is the unique equilibrium (Assumption 3). Recall that appli-
cant ordinal preferences are truthfully revealed under DA (see the discussion in Section 4).
Second, we estimate program preferences over applicants from programs’ submitted rank-
ings of applicants, given the assumption that programs truthfully report their preferences
(Assumption 1). We next use data on final grades to estimate applicants’ beliefs about their
probabilities of acceptance by each program.
Optimal strategies of applicants depend on the solution concept that we retain. We
specify the structure of incomplete information of the game that applicants are assumed
to play, leading to use a Bayesian Nash equilibrium as defined in Section 2. That is, when
submitting ROLs, we assume that each applicant knows her own preferences but not others’,
even though she is aware of their distribution. Moreover, in spite of knowing what criteria
programs use to rank applicants, she is uncertain about how she is ranked by programs. This
game may seem combinatorially complex, because an applicant can choose from a large set
of ROLs. However, under DA-T and DA-C, optimal strategies are to drop some programs
from the true preference order (Haeringer and Klijn, 2009), which makes it simpler to play.
Finally, we simulate the counterfactual equilibria attained when different versions of
DA-T and DA-C are used.
The rest of this section formalizes the game of incomplete information. We first specify
the following key elements: (i) The estimation of applicants’ cardinal preferences, (ii) the
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estimation of program preferences, (iii) the information structure and solution concept, and
(iv) applicants’ beliefs about program preferences. For counterfactual analyses, we also
explain the procedure for computing equilibria under each of these mechanisms.
5.1 Applicant Preferences
For each applicant, we observe a submitted ROL under DA, pl,1i , . . . , l
,J
i q, which corresponds
to her true ordinal preferences and from the survey, we observe whether each program is
definitely acceptable, possibly acceptable, or unacceptable to the applicant. To reiterate,
we do not use the data from DA-T-4 and DA-C, because the applicants may not play an
equilibrium strategy in the experiment (see the discussion in Section 4).
Econometric model. Suppressing subscript i, we first postulate that the utility function
associated with each program, j P t1, . . . , Ju, is:
vj  xβj   εj, (1)
in which εj is extreme-value distributed and independent across programs. The parame-
ters, βj, are program-specific but not individual-specific, an assumption that we maintain
throughout the paper. Furthermore, we model acceptability using an outside option whose
value is the sum of two terms. The first term is observed at the moment of the application
decision and is written as
v0  xβ0   ε0. (2)
To model programs as “definitely acceptable”, “possibly acceptable”, or “unacceptable”, we
posit that final acceptability is determined by adding to v0 the value of another random
variable, η P rxβf η, xβf   ηs, which is revealed after the matching process.
9 Program j is
said to be definitely acceptable if and only if it has a value higher than the best possible
outside option:
vj ¡ v0   xβf   η for any η,
that is,
vj ¡ v0   xβf   η.
9This formalization to take into account the three types of acceptability differs from our theoretical
framework in Section 2. However, as long as we categorize both “definitely acceptable” and “possibly
acceptable” as acceptable, our theoretical results still hold true.
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Similarly, the program is deemed (definitely) unacceptable if and only if it is always
dominated by the worst possible outside option:
vj   v0   xβf   η.
Otherwise, the applicant considers the program possibly acceptable if
vj P rv0   xβf   η, v0   xβf   ηs. (3)
Let the ranking information be described as the ROL complemented with the max/min
outside options pO,Oq so that the observation is now an extended ROL:
pl,1, . . . , l,J , O, l,J 1, . . . , O, l,J , . . . , l,Jq,
in which l,J P J for 1 ¤ J ¤ J is the lowest-ranked definitely acceptable program. When
J  0, there is no definitely acceptable program, and when J  J , all programs are definitely
acceptable. Similarly, l,J P J for 1 ¤ J ¤ J is the highest-ranked unacceptable program
so that J ¡ J and that J ¡ J implies an absence of unacceptable programs.
Identification and likelihood function. A location normalization is needed, and the
simplest one sets the lower bound of the outside option to zero:
pβ0   βf q  0, η  0.
The upper bound, η, is to be estimated. The scale normalization is given by the usual logit
assumption. The parameter vector is thus described by θ  ppβjqj1,...,J , ηq. If the survey
information on program acceptability were not available, the choice probability of ROL
pl1, . . . , lJq would be described by an exploded logit (Beggs, Cardell and Hausman, 1981):
Prpvl1  max
jPt1,...,Ju
vj, vl2  max
jPt2,...,Ju








When we introduce information on program acceptability, the likelihood function can be
written as a sum of exploded logit terms (see Appendix C).
Results. We consider various sets of explanatory variables taken from administrative in-
formation on grades, M1 program (Economics, Econometrics and Statistics, Economics and
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Law), gender, age, and having a scholarship or not. There are many course grades that
can be used at a fine level of detail. Because of the timing of the application decision, we
opt to use the M1 first-semester grade as the main explanatory variable. At the time of
application, no applicant knows his/her final grades, the weighted sum of his/her first- and
second-semester grades.
The results are presented in Table 9. A clear pattern is that one’s M1 program have
some power to predict her preferences over the M2 programs, as the coefficients of “M1
Economics” and “M1 Statistics” have different signs across M2 programs.
Table 9: Estimation of Applicant Preferences
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7
Grade: First semester 0.28 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.00 -0.04 -0.01
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08)
M1 Program: Economics 0.58 -0.37 0.83 -0.12 -0.027 -6.65 0.016
(0.50) (0.49) (0.98) (0.78) (0.55) (1.16) (0.51)
M1 Program: Statistics 1.13 -0.71 2.73 -0.31 -0.02 -6.43 0.58
(0.51) (0.52) (1.02) (0.81) (0.59) (1.18) (0.54)
Female -0.39 0.95 0.55 -0.54 0.672 0.51 -0.04
(0.31) (0.30) (0.30) (0.31) (0.27) (0.36) (0.32)
Scholarship -0.57 -0.99 -0.024 -0.58 0.00 -0.32 -0.70
(0.36) (0.37) (0.27) (0.35) (0.27) (0.40) (0.33)
Intercept 1.11 0.71 0.377 1.88 0.55 -0.87 0.40
(0.16) (0.16) (0.18) (0.16) (0.14) (0.19) (0.16)
Upper bound of shocks to the outside option: 0.707 (0.07)
Notes: Estimation is based on applicants’ submitted ROLs under DA supplemented with survey information on program
acceptability. The likelihood function is specified in Appendix C and can be considered as an extended version of the multinomial
logit with rank-ordered data combined with acceptability. The McFadden pseudo-R-squared is equal to 0.078.
5.2 Program Preferences
Program j sets a latent score for each applicant, si,j, according to which applicants are
ranked. Conditional on meeting prerequisites pi,j (a binary variable), si,j is assumed to
depend only on the final grade (the credit-weighted average of grades from two semesters),
FinalGradei, and some noise,
si,j  FinalGradei   σξi,j, (4)
in which ξi,j is extreme value distributed. The term ξi,j stands for the additional information
that programs can use beyond final grades. ξi,j is assumed to be independent of FinalGradei
and the covariates, xi. Based on our robustness checks, including additional covariates leads
to similar results.
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Program prerequisites are common knowledge, and applicants condition their decision
on pi,j. Program preferences are therefore lexicographical and rank the subsample pi,j  1
first, the subsample pi,j  0 second, and according to si,j within the first subsample.
10
Given the structure of the experiment, we can estimate the parameters governing pro-
gram preferences using a rank-ordered logit on the subsample of applicants satisfying the
prerequisites, pi,j  1. Nonetheless, the rank-ordered logit procedure is fragile when many
alternatives – or applicants – are considered, as we do here, in a small sample of seven pro-
grams. Therefore, we consider a limited information procedure using only length-K rankings
among applicants with K ¥ 2.
Specifically, let the full ranking of applicants for program j be pi
pjq
1 , ., i
pjq
I q, and partition
this length-I vector into IpKq vectors starting with pi1,., iKq, then piK,., i2K1q, etc. We
write the pseudo-likelihood function corresponding to these J  IpKq observations treated
as ROLs while neglecting possible correlations across observations. This process does not
affect the consistency of the estimates (Avery, Hansen and Hotz, 1983), although standard
errors should be computed using a sandwich formula.11
Results. The estimation of the latent score, equation (4), depends on how we choose K
to form length-K ROLs. We present results for three different K’s, while the results from
K  2 are used in the counterfactual analysis. The estimates for K P t2, 3, 4u are as follows:
K  2: s˜i,j  FinalGradei   0.058
p.022q
 ξi,j,McFadden pseudo R
2  0.337;
K  3: s˜i,j  FinalGradei   0.056
p.020q
 ξi.j,McFadden pseudo R
2  0.391;
K  4: s˜i,j  FinalGradei   0.049
p.015q
 ξi,j,McFadden pseudo R
2  0.496.
5.3 Solution Concept and Information Structure
We first clarify the solution concept and evaluation approach that are used in counterfactual
analysis. Solution concepts depend on the information that each applicant has, as Panel A of
Table 10 shows. A possibility is to assume complete information in our matching game. That
is, both applicant and program preferences are common knowledge to every applicant, which
leads us to Nash equilibrium as the solution concept. However, the complete-information
10Because no one with pi,j  0 is accepted by program j, how we rank the applicants with pi,j  0 does
not matter, as long as they are ranked after those with pi,j  1.
11An alternative is to consider sequences pi1,., iKq, piK 1,., i2Kq, etc., in which independence may be
satisfied but information is more limited.
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assumption may be too restrictive in our setting because it is unlikely that every applicant
knows everyone else’s cardinal preferences or can predict her final grade and program pref-
erences perfectly (cf. Figure 1). Indeed, for this reason, our model in Section 2 specifies a
game of incomplete information, which leads to Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Table 10: Solution Concepts and Evaluation Methods
Panel A. Solution concepts
Complete information?
A1. Yes (Nash equilibrium) Applicant and program preferences are common knowledge. Ev-
ery applicant best responds to others’ actions in equilibrium.
A2. No (Bayesian Nash) Applicant and program preferences are private information, but
their distributions and X are common knowledge. Every ap-
plicant best responds to the distribution of others’ actions in
equilibrium, conditional on common knowledge.
Panel B. Methods for Outcome Evaluation (conditional on common knowledge X)
Conditional on observed applicant
& program ordinal preferences?
B1. Yes (sample-specific) An outcome is evaluated conditional on X and on the observed
ordinal preferences of applicants and programs. That is, we con-
sider only random draws of preference shocks consistent with the
observed ordinal preferences. Each simulated applicant (with
simulated cardinal preferences) plays an equilibrium strategy ac-
cording to either Nash equilibrium (A1) or Bayesian Nash (A2).
B2. No (population-specific) An outcome is evaluated conditional on X but unconditional
on the observed ordinal preferences of applicants and programs.
That is, we consider random draws of shocks from the assumed
distribution. Each simulated applicant (with simulated cardinal
preferences) plays an equilibrium strategy according to either
Nash equilibrium (A1) or Bayesian Nash (A2).
In addition, multiple methods are available to evaluate counterfactual outcomes, de-
pending on the use of information available to researchers. First, we always use common-
knowledge information X. As Panel B of Table 10 shows, the outcome under any given
market design can be evaluated with or without information on applicants’ and programs’
observed ordinal preferences. If the information in the data on ordinal preferences is utilized,
we have a “sample-specific” evaluation; otherwise, when this information is not used, the
method is “population-specific”.
In addition to choosing Bayesian Nash equilibrium (A2) as our solution concept, we
adopt the “sample-specific” evaluation (B1). This evaluation facilitates the comparison
between our experimental results and the counterfactual analyses, as the former is obviously
conditional on applicants’ and programs’ realized ordinal preferences.
To summarize, when solving for a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, we need every applicant to
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best respond to others with incomplete information on other applicants’ and programs’ pref-
erences. The distributions of applicant and program preferences are modeled and estimated
in the previous two subsections. However, programs form preferences with information on
final grades that is not available to applicants at the time of application (cf. Figure 2). It is
therefore necessary to consider the uncertainty in final grades when we estimate applicants’
beliefs about program preferences, which is what we turn to next.
5.4 Applicant Beliefs on Program Preferences
When forming beliefs about program preferences, applicant i observes her own characteris-
tics, xi, including her grades during the first semester and the prerequisites of each program
(pi,j  1 if i satisfies the prerequisites of program j and 0 otherwise). These prerequisites
consist of choices of courses that are made well in advance and are partially determined by
one’s M1 program. We therefore consider them as fixed in the statistical model.
We assume that applicants have rational expectations and expect that
(i) The information structure detailed above is common knowledge and, in particular,
program preferences are formed according to the model above.
(ii) Applicant i predicts her final grade FinalGradei as a function of characteristics xi,
using the following equation:
FinalGradei  xiγ   νi, (5)
in which xi includes the characteristics used in the modified exploded logit model
above and also the first-semester grade in particular; νi is assumed to have a normal
distribution.
The specifications of applicant and program preferences and the grade equation guaran-
tee that any possible applicant preference ranking and program preference ranking among
qualified applicants have a positive probability of occurrence. It is straightforward to show
that equilibrium acceptance probabilities are non-degenerate for any qualified applicant, and
therefore, Assumption 3 is satisfied.
Estimation. The rational-expectation assumption implies that applicant beliefs are con-
sistent with the distribution of final grades and program preferences.
Equation (5) is estimated by standard ordinary least squares (OLS), and the results
are shown in Table 11. Not surprisingly, the main determinant of the final grade is the
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first-semester grade. One may notice that the coefficient on “Scholarship” is significantly
negative, which may be explained by the fact that scholarship is often need-based. For the
residual νi in the grade equation, the assumption of normal distribution is reasonable, as
shown by a quantile-quantile plot of the residuals, which is available upon request.
Table 11: Estimation of the Grade Equation
Grade M1 Program
Female Scholarship Intercept
(1st semester) Economics Statistics
Estimate 0.86 -0.42 -0.73 0.08 -0.37 2.83
Std. Error (0.03) (0.25) (0.26) (0.14) (0.15) (0.42)
Notes: Number of observations: 129; Residual standard error: 0.76 on 123 degrees of freedom; R-squared: 0.87; Adjusted
R-squared: 0.86; F-statistic: 158.1 on 5 and 123 degrees of freedom, p-value:   2.2e 16.
Based on these results, in the counterfactual analysis, we simulate applicant beliefs about
program preferences by drawing νi from a normal distribution and ξi,j from extreme value
distributions. Furthermore, the prerequisites of P3 and P6 are held constant, because they
are decided well in advance. As programs’ strategic behavior is assumed away, the above
procedure describes the set-up for simulating applicant beliefs about program preferences.
5.5 Counterfactual Analysis of Market Designs
5.5.1 Simulating Equilibrium Outcomes: Procedures
We solve for a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (case A2 in Table 10) under each mechanism and
then evaluate the sample-specific counterfactual outcomes (case B1 in Table 10).
Counterfactuals under DA-T and DA-C. We perform counterfactual analysis under
DA-T with degrees of truncation varying from 1 to 6. Under DA-C, the application cost
has the following form in the counterfactual analysis:
Cp|L|q  c p|L|  1q  1t|L| ¡ 1u,
in which c is the constant marginal cost for second and further choices and c can take
one of the 11 values in t105, 3.1  105, 104, 3.1  104, ..., 0.01, 0.31, 1u, increasing on a
logarithmic scale. We have Cp|L|q  0 for |L| ¤ 1 to avoid distorting the applicants’ partic-
ipation decisions.12 Although application costs are homogenous across applicants, applicant
12This restriction can be relaxed in a more general setting. If it is costly to submit a one-choice ROL,
some applicants may choose not to participate in the matching when their expected benefit is less than the
application cost.
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responses can be heterogenous. They depend on the marginal benefit of an application
which is determined jointly by applicant preferences and acceptance probabilities.
To make sense of the magnitude of application costs, one may consider the following
thought experiment: A “possibly acceptable” program can be improved to “definitely ac-
ceptable” by adding at most 0.707, which is the estimate of the maximum shock to outside
option (η in equation 3); the same program can be demoted to “unacceptable” by subtract-
ing 0.707 at most. Moreover, the variance of utility shocks is pi2{6p 1.645q. From this
perspective, most of the above costs, especially those below 0.031, are quite small.
Computation of equilibrium. For both DA-T and DA-C, an equilibrium must be solved
as a fixed point in terms of cutoff distribution. A program’s cutoff in a given matching is the
lowest rank among the applicants accepted by the program if it has no vacancy; otherwise,
the cutoff is zero. A Bayesian Nash equilibrium can be summarized by the joint distribution
of the cutoffs of programs (Azevedo and Leshno, 2016). Given a particular draw of random
shocks, an applicant ranked above a program’s cutoff can be accepted by this program.
Solving for a Bayesian Nash equilibrium can then be achieved by finding a fixed point of
the cutoff distribution. We provide the details of computation in Appendix D.1.
Sample-specific counterfactual actions and outcomes. We evaluate the counterfac-
tual welfare conditional on applicants’ and programs’ observed ordinal preferences, which
is case B1 in Table 10 in Section 5.3. That is, the shocks to applicant preferences (ε) are
simulated conditional on the observed ROLs submitted by applicants under DA, and pro-
gram ordinal preferences are also held constant at their observed values. In this way, we
answer the following question: Based on all the information observed by the researcher, what
is the best prediction of the counterfactual outcome if a counterfactual market design had
been implemented at TSE in 2013? There are certainly many alternative counterfactual
questions that one can ask. Our choice makes it easier to compare simulated equilibrium
outcomes with the observed outcomes, because the latter certainly are derived from the
realized ordinal preferences of applicants and programs.
More specifically, we adopt the following procedure to simulate a new set of samples:
(i) In each simulation sample m, we compute applicants’ cardinal and therefore ordinal
preferences by inputting the simulated shocks ε
pmq
i , estimated coefficients, and observed
characteristics into the utility functions specified in equations (1) and (2). As spelled




ally on the ordinal preferences observed in the sample using a Gibbs sampler described
in Appendix D.2.
(ii) Each applicant submits the ROL that maximizes her expected utility, given the equilib-
rium distribution of the cutoffs, Φe. Again, an applicant’s optimal ROL can be found
by dropping some programs from her true preference order. This process is conducted
separately for each version of DA-T and DA-C.
(iii) In each simulation sample, we run the DA algorithm with the optimal ROLs submitted
by applicants and the observed program preferences.
Similar to the direct evaluation, we measure the performance of each design on several
dimensions: (i) Match quality, which is summarized by stability (or the incidence of block-
ing pairs) and unmatched applicants,13 and (ii) screening costs. In addition to examining
applicants’ and programs’ ordinal welfare, we evaluate their cardinal welfare, given that our
preference estimates have cardinal implications.
5.5.2 Counterfactual Analysis: Results
Our first set of results is summarized in Figure 4, which shows the effects of market design
on screening costs, measured as the number of candidates screened per opening, and on
match quality, measured as the number of blocking pairs and the number of unmatched
applicants.14
Subfigure (a) depicts the effects of DA-T of different degrees. DA-T-K, forK P t1, 2, ..., 7u,
means that applicants are allowed to freely rank only up to K choices; therefore, DA-T-7
is DA (without truncation). The outcomes under DA with no cost are always constant in
our sample-specific counterfactual analysis. In the figure, when increasing the application
limit from DA-T-7 to DA-T-3, match quality remains (almost) the same as the applicant-
optimal stable matching, while screening costs decrease monotonically from screening 4.16
candidates per opening to screening 2.56 per opening. When the application limit tightens
further, the screening costs decrease further to 1.75 and 0.91 candidates per opening under
DA-T-2 and DA-T-1, respectively. However, this result comes at the expense of match qual-
ity: The number of blocking pairs increases from 0.5 under DA-T-3 to 4.10 under DA-T-2
13Note that the stable matching in our data is unique in all simulation samples, given the ordinal pref-
erences of applicants and programs (c.f., Section 4). In other words, the applicant-optimal stable matching
and the program-optimal stable matching coincide.
14The confidence intervals shown in Figure 4 consider the uncertainty in applicant preferences but not
the uncertainty in the estimated coefficients, due to significant computational costs. Our simulations of
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Figure 4: Match Quality under DA with Truncations or Finite Application Costs
Notes: This figure shows the counterfactual analysis of the effects of market design on match quality (measured by the number
of blocking pairs and the number of unmatched applicants) and screening costs (measured by the number of candidates screened
per opening). Subfigure (a) depicts the effects of DA-T with different degrees, where DA-T-K, K P t1, 2, ..., 7u, meaning that
applicants are allowed to freely rank only up to K choices. Therefore, DA-T-7 is DA (without truncation). Subfigure (b)
presents the effects of DA-C with a constant marginal cost for second and later choices and a zero cost of ranking the first
choice. The constant marginal cost varies from 0 to 1 on a logarithmic scale, and it becomes DA when the cost is zero. The
dashed lines are the 90% confidence intervals from the 4000 simulation samples. There is no variation in simulating the outcome
under DA because all simulated applicant and program preferences are conditional on the observed ordinal preferences.
and then skyrockets to 30.29 under DA-T-1; we also observe some unmatched applicants,
0.86 under DA-T-2 and 4.56 under DA-T-1.
Subfigure (b) examines the effects of DA-C with a constant marginal cost for second and
further choices, the first choice being costless. As explained above, the marginal costs vary
from 0 to 1.
Several interesting patterns emerge. First, the screening costs drop dramatically, even
when there is a very low application cost: Imposing an application cost of 105 decreases
the number of candidates screened per opening by 50%, while match quality remains the
same. Second, the reduction in screening costs by this low application cost is larger than
that of DA-T-3 (although smaller than that of DA-T-2). When the cost rises, screening
costs further decrease, but the match quality begins to be impacted only when the cost is
above 0.0031. Third, when the application cost is 1, the outcome is almost identical to
DA-T-1 because the cost is so high that it is not worth ranking a second program.
In summary, Figure 4 describes the trade-off between screening costs and match quality;
most importantly, imposing a mild application cost in DA-T, and more so in DA-C, can
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significantly decrease screening costs without harming match quality. It should be empha-
sized that our equilibrium analysis considers all effects of application cost and measures the
net effect. For example, in addition to the potentially negative effects on match quality,
application costs can benefit some applications and increase their chance of being matched,
because costs reduce the competition among some applicants when other applicants stop
applying to some programs.
One may be concerned that our analysis of DA-C does not consider the costs that are
actually paid by applicants. We note that application costs can be designed as a transfer,
e.g., a fee paid to programs, rather than being purely wasteful, e.g., writing a motivation
letter. In the following, we study how applicant welfare is affected by such costs.
5.5.3 Applicants Welfare
We investigate how many applicants are better off or worse off under different market design.
The advantage of this welfare measure is that it does not compare welfare across applicants.
The results are summarized in Table 12.
Table 12: Applicant Ordinal Welfare under Different Market Designs:
Counterfactual Analysis; Relative to the Applicant-Optimal Stable Matching
DA-T of diff. degrees DA-C w/ diff. marginal application cost
Better off Worse off
Marginal cost
Better off Worse off
Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d.
DA-T-6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00001 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
DA-T-5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000031 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04
DA-T-4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0001 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.05
DA-T-3 0.04 0.20 0.21 0.41 0.00031 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.11
DA-T-2 1.40 0.88 2.16 0.86 0.001 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.20
DA-T-1 6.38 1.34 10.16 2.12 0.0031 0.11 0.34 0.12 0.38
0.01 0.36 0.60 0.40 0.67
0.031 1.13 1.00 1.24 1.11
0.1 3.56 1.57 3.71 1.47
0.31 5.55 1.46 6.87 1.89
1 6.33 1.34 10.25 2.22
Notes: The calculations are based on 4000 simulations. In each simulation, the shocks to applicants’ cardinal preferences
are drawn conditional on the observed true ordinal preferences (i.e., the submitted ROLs under DA, supplemented with the
program acceptability information). More details are provided in Appendix D.2. In each simulation sample, we calculate
cardinal welfare per application (i.e., the average of applicant welfare); the table reports the means and standard deviations of
per-applicant welfare across simulation samples. Therefore, the standard deviation measures the variation across simulation
samples but not across applicants. When simulating matching outcomes, program preferences are always fixed at the observed
values. a In counterfactual analysis, applicants play an equilibrium strategy in each simulation sample, while the equilibrium
is solved numerically, as in Appendix D.1. Given the realization of cardinal preferences, applicants may play different actions
across samples, as dictated by the equilibrium strategy. b For these calculations, applicants always take the actions played in
the experiment across all simulation samples. In the experiment, DA-C allows the applicant to rank up to three choices, and a
motivation letter is required for each additional choice. However, we do not have a measure of the magnitude of the cost.c In
the counterfactual analysis, DA-C allows applicants to rank one choice but requires a constant marginal cost for additional
choices.
In each simulation sample, we calculate how many applicants are better off (or worse
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off) relative to their individual outcome under DA – the applicant-optimal stable matching.
This welfare comparison does not take into account the application costs paid by applicants.
The table then reports the means and standard deviations across simulation samples.
As shown in the table, applicants (almost) always obtain the applicant-optimal stable
outcome when the application cost is low (i.e., under DA-T-3 to DA-T-6 or DA-C with a
marginal cost of no more than 0.01). However, whenever the outcomes deviate from the
applicant-optimal stable outcome, there are more “losers” than “winners.” Noticeably, when
the application cost is prohibitively high, such as in DA-T-1 or DA-C with a cost of 1, there
are more than 10 applicants who are worse off. This highlights the detrimental effects of
high application costs.
We present additional results on applicant cardinal preferences in Appendix Table D.2.
Allowing inter-personal comparison of utility, we draw similar conclusions. See Appendix D.3
for a detailed discussion.
5.5.4 Program Welfare in Matching Outcomes
Given the two-sided nature of the matching game, we are also interested in program welfare
from matching outcomes without taking into account screening costs.
We define two measures of program welfare while maintaining the assumption that pro-
grams have responsive preferences.15 The first measure is the sum of the final grades of
all of the program’s matched applicants. That is, for program j, its welfare given match-
ing µ is
°
iPµ1pjq FinalGradei. The second measure takes into account programs’ ordinal
preferences,
°
iPµ1pjq ri,j for each j. Namely, j receives 129 points if matched with its top
applicant and 1 point if matched with its lowest-ranked applicant. By construction, both
measures take into account the quantity and quality of matched applicants.
Similar to the analysis of applicant welfare, we compute the number of “winners” and
“losers” according to the two welfare measures (Table 13). It should be emphasized that
this welfare analysis does not consider screening costs.
Table 13 shows that there are more “losers” than “winners” when the application cost
increases. This pattern holds true with both of the welfare measures. When the application
cost is low, the effects on program welfare are negligible.
We present additional results on program cardinal preferences in Appendix Table D.3.
15We choose not to use the estimate of the latent score (equation 4) to measure programs’ cardinal
preferences because (i) only the ordinal information in program preferences matter in the game (not the
cardinality) and (ii) the only observable determining the latent score is applicants’ final grade. The latter
justification motivates our first measure of program welfare.
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Table 13: Program Welfare under Different Market Designs
Counterfactual Analysis; Relative to the Program-Optimal Stable Matching
DA-T of diff. degrees DA-C w/ diff. marginal application costc
Better off Worse off
Marginal cost
Better off Worse off
Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d.
A. Program Welfare Definition 1: Gradesb
DA-T-6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00001 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
DA-T-5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000031 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
DA-T-4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0001 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
DA-T-3 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.00031 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02
DA-T-2 0.12 0.06 0.29 0.10 0.001 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.04
DA-T-1 0.26 0.13 0.55 0.12 0.0031 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.08
0.01 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.13
0.031 0.11 0.10 0.21 0.16
0.1 0.18 0.11 0.41 0.11
0.31 0.27 0.12 0.48 0.11
1 0.28 0.13 0.54 0.11
B. Program Welfare Definition 2: Rank b
DA-T-6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00001 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
DA-T-5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000031 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
DA-T-4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0001 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
DA-T-3 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.00031 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02
DA-T-2 0.16 0.09 0.26 0.11 0.001 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.04
DA-T-1 0.36 0.15 0.45 0.12 0.0031 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.08
0.01 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.13
0.031 0.12 0.10 0.21 0.16
0.1 0.20 0.11 0.39 0.11
0.31 0.33 0.13 0.42 0.12
1 0.36 0.13 0.45 0.12
Notes: The counterfactual simulation is the same as that in Table 12; the notes therein provide more details. In each of the
4000 simulation samples, we first calculate how many programs are better off (or worse off) relative to the program-optimal
matching according to two measures. The first is the sum of final grades of all applicants matched with the given program, and
the second is the sum of matched applicants’ rankings by the program (129 points if matched with the top-ranked applicant,
1 point if matched with the lowest-ranked applicant). Under a given market design, the table then reports the means and
standard deviations of the measures on welfare changes across simulation samples.
Allowing inter-program comparison of welfare, we draw similar conclusions. See Appendix D.3
for a detailed discussion.
6 Conclusion and Discussion
This paper investigates the market design for a two-sided many-to-one matching market with
the application cost as a tool to reduce congestion and lower the screening costs of programs.
Both forms of application cost, DA-T (an application limit) and DA-C (a positive marginal
cost of application), are effective in reducing congestion. However, some key differences
should be noted.
First, under DA-T of degree K, the marginal cost of applying to an additional program
is zero when the total number of applications is below K. However, the marginal benefit
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of applying to an additional acceptable program, which can be small, is always positive
because of the full-support assumption on applicant and program preferences. Therefore,
applicants always optimally apply to K programs under DA-T-K whenever they have at
least K acceptable programs. In comparison, under DA-C, an applicant considers the posi-
tive marginal cost for additional applications and therefore may choose not to apply to an
acceptable program.
Second, the programs to which an applicant chooses not to apply under DA-C must
have marginal benefits lower than the marginal costs, implying that the expected loss in
match quality is bounded by application cost. DA-T does not offer such an opportunity
for bounding losses. This observation implies the possibility that the market designer, with
little information on applicants’ and programs’ preferences, chooses a very low application
cost and reduces congestion significantly without sacrificing match quality.
Third, although neither DA-T nor DA-C is strategy-proof, DA-C offers an opportunity
for less strategic applicants to play safe by paying application costs. This is a desirable
feature as non-strategic applicants may lose to sophisticated applicants in a non-strategy-
proof mechanism (Pathak and So¨nmez, 2008). DA-T can only provide such a safety measure
when it does not substantially restrict the number of applications, in which case it is not
effective in reducing congestion.
Fourth, DA-C is also more flexible in the sense that application costs can be non-linear
or program-specific. For instance, a popular program can impose a high application cost.
Fifth, although application costs and pollution taxes are essentially the same, application
limits, or DA-T, do not resemble a cap-and-trade scheme, because there is no trading of
rights to submit applications in a matching market. Therefore, the equivalence between
regulating prices and fixing quantities in the setting of Weitzman (1974) no longer holds in
our matching model.
Lastly, application costs may have potential in combatting congestion in decentralized
market. For example, consistent with our results, Pallais (2015) documents that application
costs significantly influence the number of per-student applications in decentralized U.S.
college admissions.
Regarding research design, our study marries real-life, experimental data with a struc-
tural analysis. This choice of research design deserves some discussion, especially in terms
of experimental design, assumptions in the structural analysis, and external validity.
One might argue that, given the realized preferences of both applicants and programs,
our choice of mechanisms, DA-T-4 and a version of DA-C under which it is free to submit
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up to three choices, is too conservative. In the end, 99 percent of the applicants are matched
with their top-3-preferred programs. At the time of designing the experiment, we were not
willing to gamble on the match quality in exchange for uncertain screening costs, given that
it was the first time this formal centralized match was implemented in our specific setting. It
is true that, had we known the structure of preferences, we might have tried more restrictive
DA-T and DA-C. In a sense, because it is a field experiment, we have mimicked what would
happen in real life in order to learn about the structural parameters.
In the structural analysis, we assume that every applicant behaves rationally. However,
our data from the experiment indicate that applicants are not fully optimizing, proba-
bly because of the complexity of the game. Importantly, the conclusions drawn from the
experiment and those from the structural analysis are similar, both qualitatively and quan-
titatively. This implies that deviations from full rationality, which is a topic outside the
scope of this paper, have no significant consequences on the conclusions of our study.
The question of external validity is difficult to address without considering specific bench-
marks. In our experiment, applicant preferences are highly heterogeneous (i.e., “horizontal”
applicant preferences), while programs have similar ordinal preferences over applicants (i.e.,
“vertical” program preferences). Such preference patterns are also documented or considered
in the literature, for example, Agarwal (2015) on the medical match in the US, Carvalho
et al. (forthcoming) on university admissions in Brazil, and Che and Koh (2016) on decen-
tralized college admissions. One may expect that congestion should be less likely to happen
in these settings, and yet it does occur in our experiment. One may further argue that ap-
plication costs would be less effective in other settings, e.g., those with more homogeneous
applicant preferences. Although the exact effects of application costs would depend on the
context, the way how application costs work remains the same: an application cost will
discourage an applicant from applying to programs that are unlikely to accept her and/or
are not so attractive to her.
40
References
Abdulkadiroglu, Atila and Tayfun So¨nmez, “Matching markets: Theory and practice,”
Advances in Economics and Econometrics, 2013, 1, 3–47.
Abdulkadirog˘lu, Atila, Nikhil Agarwal, and Parag A Pathak, “The welfare effects
of coordinated assignment: evidence from the New York City high school match,”
American Economic Review, 2017, 107 (12), 3635–89.
Agarwal, Nikhil, “An empirical model of the medical match,” American Economic Review,
2015, 105 (7), 1939–78.
and Paulo Somaini, “Demand Analysis using Strategic Reports: An Application to
a School Choice Mechanism,” Econometrica, Forthcoming.
Ajayi, Kehinde, “School Choice and Educational Mobility: Lessons from Secondary School
Applications in Ghana,” 2013. Manuscript.
Arnosti, Nick, Ramesh Johari, and Yash Kanoria, “Managing congestion in dynamic
matching markets,” 2016.
Artemov, Georgy, Yeon-Koo Che, and Yinghua He, “Strategic ‘Mistakes’: Implica-
tions for Market Design Research,” 2017.
Ashlagi, Itai, Mark Braverman, Yash Kanoria, and Peng Shi, “Clearing Matching
Markets Efficiently: Informative Signals and Match Recommendations,” 2018.
Avery, Robert B, Lars Hansen, and V. Joseph Hotz, “Multiperiod Probit Models
and Orthogonality Condition Estimation,” International Economic Review, 1983, 24
(1), 21–35.
Azevedo, Eduardo and Jacob Leshno, “A Supply and Demand Framework for Two-
Sided Matching Markets,” Journal of Political Economy, 2016.
Beggs, Steven, Scott Cardell, and Jerry Hausman, “Assessing the potential demand
for electric cars,” Journal of econometrics, 1981, 17 (1), 1–19.
Bickel, Peter J and Anat Sakov, “On the choice of m in the m out of n bootstrap and
confidence bounds for extrema,” Statistica Sinica, 2008, pp. 967–985.
Blundell, Richard, “What Have We Learned from Structural Models?,” American Eco-
nomic Review, 2017, 107 (5), 287–292.
Calsamiglia, Caterina, Chao Fu, and Maia Gu¨ell, “Structural Estimation of a Model
of School Choices: the Boston Mechanism vs. Its Alternatives,” 2014. Barcelona GSE
Working Paper No. 811.
, Guillaume Haeringer, and Flip Klijn, “Constrained School Choice: An Experi-
mental Study,” American Economic Review, September 2010, 100 (4), 1860–74.
Carvalho, Jose´-Raimundo, Thierry Magnac, and Qizhou Xiong, “College Entry
and Allocation Mechanisms,” Quantitative Economics, forthcoming.
Chade, Hector, Gregory Lewis, and Lones Smith, “Student portfolios and the college
admissions problem,” Review of Economic Studies, 2014, 81 (3), 971–1002.
41
Che, Yeon-Koo and Youngwoo Koh, “Decentralized College Admissions,” Journal of
Political Economy, 2016, 124 (5), 1295–1338.
Coles, Peter, Alexey Kushnir, and Muriel Niederle, “Preference signaling in match-
ing markets,” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2013, 5 (2), 99–134.
Dubins, Lester E. and David A. Freedman, “Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algo-
rithm,” American Mathematical Monthly, 1981, 88 (7), 485–494.
Fack, Gabrielle, Julien Grenet, and Yinghua He, “Beyond Truth-Telling: Prefer-
ence Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions,” American
Economic Review, Forthcoming.
Fradkin, Andrey, “Search frictions and the design of online marketplaces,” NBER Work-
ing Paper, 2014.
Gale, David E. and Lloyd S. Shapley, “College Admissions and the Stability of Mar-
riage,” American Mathematical Monthly, 1962, 69 (1), 9–15.
Haeringer, Guillaume and Flip Klijn, “Constrained School Choice,” Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, 2009, 144 (5), 1921–1947.
Hafalir, Isa E, Rustamdjan Hakimov, Dorothea Ku¨bler, and Morimitsu Kurino,
“College admissions with entrance exams: Centralized versus decentralized,” Technical
Report, SFB 649 Discussion Paper 2016.
Halaburda, Hanna, Mikolaj Jan Piskorski, and Pinar Yildirim, “Competing by
restricting choice: the case of search platforms,” Harvard Business School Strategy
Unit Working Paper, 2015, (10-098).
Hassidim, Avinash, Assaf Romm, and Ran Shorrer, ““Strategic” Behavior in a
Strategy-proof Environment,” 2016. mimeo.
Hastings, Justine, Thomas Kane, and Douglas Staiger, “Heterogeneous Preferences
and the Efficacy of Public School Choice,” 2008. Manuscript.
He, Yinghua, “Gaming the Boston School Choice Mechanism in Beijing,” 2015. TSE
Working Paper No. 15-551.
Horton, John J, “Supply constraints as a market friction: Evidence from an online labor
market,” 2015.
Hwang, Sam Il Myoung, “How does heterogeneity in beliefs affect students in the Boston
Mechanism,” Working Paper, 2017.
Kanoria, Yash and Daniela Saban, “Facilitating the search for partners on matching
platforms: Restricting agent actions,” 2017.
Lee, Robin S. and Michael Schwarz, “Interviewing in two-sided matching markets,”
The RAND Journal of Economics, 2017, 48 (3), 835–855.
Milgrom, Paul and Robert Weber, “Distributional Strategies for Games with Incom-
plete Information,” Mathematics of Operations Research, 1985, 10 (4), 619–632.
42
Nguyen, Kim, Michael Peters, and Michel Poitevin, “Can EconJobMarket help
Canadian universities?,” Canadian Journal of Economics, 2018, 50 (5), 1573–1594.
Pallais, Amanda, “Small Differences That Matter: Mistakes in Applying to College,”
Journal of Labor Economics, 2015, 33 (2), 493–520.
Pathak, Parag A, “The mechanism design approach to student assignment,” Annu. Rev.
Econ., 2011, 3 (1), 513–536.
and Peng Shi, “How Well Do Structural Demand Models Work? Counterfactual Pre-
dictions in School Choice,” Technical Report, National Bureau of Economic Research
2017.
and Tayfun So¨nmez, “Leveling the playing field: Sincere and sophisticated players
in the Boston mechanism,” American Economic Review, 2008, 98 (4), 1636–52.
Pathak, Parag A. and Tayfun So¨nmez, “School Admissions Reform in Chicago and Eng-
land: Comparing Mechanisms by Their Vulnerability to Manipulation,” The American
Economic Review, September 2013, 103 (1), 80–106.
Rogerson, Richard, Robert Shimer, and Randall Wright, “Search-Theoretic Models
of the Labor Market: A Survey,” Journal of Economic Literature, 2005, 43 (4), 959–988.
Roth, Alvin E., “The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives,” Mathematics of
Operations Research, 1982, 7 (4), 617–628.
, “A Natural Experiment in the Organization of Entry-Level Labor Markets: Regional
Markets for New Physicians and Surgeons in the United Kingdom,” American Economic
Review, 1991, 81 (3), 415–40.
and Marilda A. Oliveira Sotomayor, Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-
Theoretic Modeling and Analysis Econometric Society Monograph Series, Cambridge
University Press, 1990.
and Xiaolin Xing, “Turnaround Time and Bottlenecks in Market Clearing: De-
centralized Matching in the Market for Clinical Psychologists,” Journal of Political
Economy, 1997, 105 (2), 284–329.
Seabright, Paul and Ananya Sen, “Statistical Externalities and the Labour Market in
the Digital Age,” 2015.
Shorrer, Ran I and Sa´ndor So´va´go´, “Obvious Mistakes in a Strategically Simple College-
Admissions Environment,” Technical Report, Working paper 2017.





Application Costs and Congestion in Matching Markets
Yinghua He Thierry Magnac
February 1, 2019
List of Appendices
Appendix A: Experiment: Design and Implementation A.2
Appendix B: Data A.5
Appendix C: Likelihood Function based on the Extended Rank-Order List A.7
Appendix D: Counterfactual Analysis A.18
Appendix E: Screen Shots from the Web Site for the Experiment A.28
A.1
Appendix A Experiment: Design and Implementation
A.1 The Boston Immediate Acceptance Mechanism
A popular mechanism is the Immediate Acceptance mechanism (IA), also known as the
Boston mechanism, which solicits ROLs from applicants, uses programs’ strict rankings
over applicants as inputs, and includes multiple rounds:
Round 1. Each program considers all the applicants who rank it first and assigns its
positions in the order of the program’s preferences until either no positions remain or no
applicant who has listed it as his/her first choice remains.
Generally, in
Round k (k ¡ 1). The kth choice of applicants who have not yet been assigned is
considered. Each program that still has available positions assigns the remaining positions
to applicants who rank the program as their kth choice in the order of that program’s
preferences until either no positions remain or no applicant who has listed it as his/her kth
choice remains.
The process terminates after any round k in which every applicant is assigned a position
at some program or if the only applicants who remain unassigned listed no more than k
choices.
A.2 Design: Interface for Applicants
The experiment provides applicants with an interface hosted on the official website that
Universite´ Toulouse 1 Capitole uses for coursework. With screenshots from the website
(Figures E.1–E.5), this appendix details each step of the experiment involving applicants.
To minimize the potential “framing” effects, we randomize on three dimensions: (1) The
order of the programs in the survey questionnaire on acceptability, (2) the order of the
programs when applicants are asked to rank them under the four mechanisms, and (3)
the order of mechanisms in which applicants play. First, applicants are randomly and
(almost) evenly divided into seven groups. Second, for each group, we assign an order of the
seven programs to be presented when asking applicants to report acceptability. The seven
program orders are such that each program is presented once first, once last, and the rest
at random positions. Third, each group faces the “reverse” program order when asked to
rank the programs under the four mechanisms. That is, if P1 is the first to be shown in the
acceptability survey, it is presented last when the applicant decides her ROL, and vice versa.
Moreover, these seven program orders are the same ones used in the survey. Finally, each
group of applicants plays the four mechanisms following one of the four orders conditional
on DA-C and DA-T always being after DA.
A.2
The experiment begins with the welcome page (Figure E.1) to which applicants have
access after being notified by email. It describes in both English and French the purpose of
the experiment (i.e., trying four mechanisms instead of adopting only one mechanism) and
explains important dates and other information. The above content is the same for every
applicant; then, every applicant clicks the link that takes her to the next screen, which
differs across applicants.
On the second webpage, we implement a survey on program acceptability (Figure E.2).
For each given program, applicants reveal their enrollment decision under the assumption
that they were only accepted by that program. It is emphasized that the answers to survey
questions are not used in the actual matching mechanisms. The order of the programs is
randomized to avoid potential framing effects. Similarly, the link to the next step is also
randomized such that one may play either IA or DA first.
Once they have reached the webpage to submit an ROL under a given mechanism,
applicants are given suggestions on how to play the specific game (Figures E.3-E.5). It is
also emphasized that each ROL submitted under a given mechanism is used if and only if the
mechanism is selected for the final assignment. Under every mechanism, all the programs
are listed for applicants to rank and the order of the programs is randomized.
A.3 Programs’ Involvement in the Experiment
When designing the experiment, all the program directors were informed about the exper-
iment and its intended purposes. The seven directors were involved at all stages of the
experiment.
Pre-experiment stage. Each director was asked to provide a short description of the
program, prerequisites (if any), and a capacity. This information was then uploaded to the
website for the experiment.
Screening candidates. We did not simply forward applicants’ submitted ROLs under
the four mechanisms to the program directors. There were several concerns. First, we
intended to prevent the directors from learning applicants’ ROLs (i.e., how each applicant
ranked the programs). Second, providing all ROLs would require the directors to screen too
many candidates (c.f., Table 8).
Instead, in the files containing all the applicants, their grades and their M1 program
enrollment information, we pre-selected a subset of applicants for each program.A.1 Each
A.1This pre-selection resembles the service provided by recruiting firms to employers. Although it may
have potentials in reducing congestion, this practice is beyond the scope of our study.
A.3
program director received a program-specific file and was asked to rank all the applicants
within it. We explained that the pre-selected applicants were those who would be considered
by the program with a high probability, while the others were unlikely to be considered. At
the same time, we strongly encouraged them to screen as many candidates as possible. When
ranking candidates, the program directors had flexibility: They did not have to respect the
ranking by grades; the ranking could be weak; and if necessary, ties in the mechanisms
would be broken by grades.
We pre-selected applicants by running the four mechanisms with “fictitious” program
preferences and capacities. We created those program preferences by adding noises to appli-
cants’ final grades. For each program, the pre-selected applicants were those who had ever
been “considered” (either accepted or rejected) by the program in these simulations.
Among the seven programs, the number of pre-selected candidates ranged from 27 to
52, with a mean of 41. No director screened more candidates beyond the pre-selected ones.
This process was proven “successful” in the sense that beyond the pre-selected applicants
for a program, no one was ever “considered” by the program under any mechanism.
It should be emphasized that the applicants are not informed of this pre-selection at any
stage. It is therefore impossible that their behavior is affected by this practice. Moreover,
every program is encouraged to screen everyone, and the properties of each market design
presented in Section 2.2 are thus invariant to pre-selection.
Motivation letters. The directors did not have access to the motivation letters because
receiving a letter from an applicant would imply that the applicant did not rank the program
within their top three choices. We planned to transmit the letters to the directors if (a)
there were a large number of applicants assigned to the fourth or lower choices under DA-C
and (b) if the administration would choose the DA-C outcome upon seeing the tentative
DA-C outcome together with the outcomes from the other three mechanisms. Ultimately,
all applicants except one – who was unmatched – were matched with one of their top three
choices (see Table 6). Therefore, the tentative DA-C outcome was very similar to the “real
one” that could have been obtained had the directors had access to the letters.A.2 Moreover,
upon seeing the results, the TSE administration did not choose DA-C.
A.2Had the directors seen the letters, the unmatched applicant would not have had a different outcome
because she/he submitted only three choices.
A.4
Appendix B Data
B.1 Programs’ Ranking over All Applicants
As discussed in Appendix A.3, the program directors did not rank all applicants, while
a complete order that ranks all applicants by each program is needed for counterfactual
analysis. We construct the complete order by the following steps:
(i) The partial orders of applicants that are submitted by the program directors are always
respected in the constructed complete orders.
(ii) For the two programs with prerequisites, every applicant who does not meet the pre-
requisites is ranked at the bottom in a descending order of their final grades.
(iii) For each program, the complete order by applicants’ final grades is respected whenever
it is not in conflict with the program’s submitted partial order. When there is a conflict,
we do the following adjustment: Suppose applicant i is moved up in the submitted
partial order and is just above applicant i. This implies that i’s final grade is lower
than i’s. In the constructed complete order, i is also just above i. We iterate this
process for each conflict between the ranking by final grades and the submitted partial
order.
B.2 Data Cleaning
B.2.1 Acceptability and Applicant Strategies
The survey data on program acceptability and applicants’ submitted true preferences under
DA are not always consistent with each other. Because we emphasize to applicants that the
survey data is not used in the matching mechanisms, the DA data should have a greater
weight. Below, we describe how we make some modifications, but as few as possible, in the
survey data to restore consistency.
According to the original survey data, one applicant is matched with an unacceptable
program (the third choice in the submitted DA ROL) under the three versions of the DA
mechanism and with another under IA (the fourth choice in the submitted DA ROL). More-
over, we observe that the applicant enrolls in the matched program under DA in September
2013. We therefore change the applicants’ third and fourth choices to be “possibly accept-
able.”
Another type of inconsistency occurs when an applicant ranks an unacceptable program
above an acceptable or puts a “possibly acceptable” program above a “definitely acceptable”
in the submitted DA ROL. There are in total nine applicants who have this inconsistency.
A.5
We detail our modifications in Table B.1. The principle is as following: Given an applicant,
her submitted ROL is taken as the true preference order; therefore, the ROL should always
rank “definitely acceptable” programs above “possibly acceptable” ones which are above
“unacceptables.” In other words, program acceptability should never increase when we
move down in the ROL. When there is a violation between a pair, say lk and lk 1 such that
lk 1’s acceptability is higher than lk’s, we change lk 1’s acceptability to lk’s. It turns out
that we only need to make one modification like this in each of the nice ROLs (Table B.1).
Table B.1: Modifications to the Survey Data on Program Acceptability
Submitted ROL Original Program Acceptability Modified Program Acceptability
App. under DA P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7
1 (P3, P1, P4, P7, P2, P6, P5) 1 -1 1 1 -1 0 0 1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 0
2 (P3, P4, P7, P2, P5, P6, P1) -1 1 1 1 -1 -1 0 -1 0 1 1 -1 -1 0
3 (P4, P3, P2, P5, P6, P1, P7) 0 0 0 1 0 -1 -1 -1 0 0 1 0 -1 -1
4 (P3, P1, P7, P4, P2, P5, P6) 1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 0 1 -1 1 0 -1 -1 0
5 (P2, P1, P4, P5, P3, P7, P6) 1 1 0 0 0 0 -1 1 1 0 0 0 -1 -1
6 (P2, P5, P3, P1, P4, P6, P5) 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1
7 (P4, P5, P1, P2, P7, P3, P6) 1 1 1 1 1 -1 0 1 1 0 1 1 -1 0
8 (P1, P4, P3, P2, P7, P5, P6) 1 0 1 1 0 -1 1 1 0 1 1 0 -1 0
9 (P2, P4, P1, P3, P5, P6, P7) 1 1 1 1 -1 1 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1
Notes: Modified program acceptability is in red boldface.
B.2.2 Repeated Choices in DA-C
Under DA-C, the applicant interface on the web site allows one to repeatedly rank the same
program multiple times. Indeed, there are two applicants (i and i1) following this pattern.







































The two applicants do not provide additional motivation letters for repeated choices, and
both of them are assigned to their respective first choice under DA-C.
A.6
Appendix C Likelihood Function based on the Extended
Rank-Order List
This appendix details the derivation of the likelihood function based on the extended rank-
order list which is the ROL submitted under DA supplemented by information on program
acceptability.
C.1 Notations and Properties
Let:
Gpx, λ, µq  µ exppλ exppxqq.
Note that a Type I extreme value random variable is such that:





Gpx  a, λ, µq  Gpx, λ exppaq, µq.
We also have:
Gpx, λ1, µ1qGpx, λ2, µ2q  Gpx, λ1   λ2, µ1µ2q,
and




exppxq expp exppxqqGpx, λ, µqdx  µ
» y
8














These properties are used below.
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C.2 The Rank-Ordered Multinomial Logit
To simplify notations, we define vj  xβj   εj  bj   εj, omitting the index for applicants.
Furthermore, consider:






 EJ1 pGpεJ1   bJ1  bJ , 1, 1qq ,
 EJ1 pGpεJ1, exppbJ  bJ1q, 1q ,
 Gp 8, 1  exppbJ  bJ1q,
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εJ2   bJ2  bJ1, 1  exppbJ  bJ1q,
1








εJ2, exppbJ1  bJ2q   exppbJ  bJ2q,
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which is the usual rank-ordered logit (or exploded logit) formula. By extension:
PrpvJK ¡ vJK 1, ., vJ1 ¡ vJq
 EJK pGpεJK , λJK , µJKqq
 Gp 8, λJK1, µJK1q  µJK1,
















k¡m exppbk  bmq
.
Further iteration yields:













C.3 Derivation of Likelihood Function
To further simplify notations, without loss of generality, we let the extended rank-order list
Lf be p1, ..., J, O, J   1, ..., J  1, O, J, ..., Jq. We derive the following likelihood:
L  Prpv1 ¥ ... ¥ vJ¯ ¥ v0 ¥ vJ¯ 1 ¥ ... ¥ vJ1 ¥ v0 ¥ vJ ¥ ... ¥ vJq,
where v0 and v0 are the max and min value of outside option. Moreover, by normalization,
v0  ε0. From the above results, the term at the right of v0 equals:












Nonetheless, the term PrpvJ¯ ¥ v¯ ¥ vJ¯ 1 ¥ . ¥ vJ1 ¥ v ¥ vJ ¥ . ¥ vJq requires a different
evaluation from above because ε0 affects both v0 and v0.
We start from the case in which there are more than two “possibly acceptable” alter-
natives and show that it applies as well to the case in which there are fewer “possibly
acceptable” alternatives.
C.3.1 Two or More “Possibly Acceptable” Alternatives
Consider that there are h “possibly acceptable” alternatives i.e. J¯   1  J  h, ., J  1 are
associated to don’t know.
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A backward induction mechanism. Start the induction from :
Mpε
J2






p0q, µp0qq pGpεJ2, exppbJ1  bJ2q, 1q Gpε0, exppbJ1q, 1qq ,
 GpεJ2, exppbJ1  bJ2q, 1qG0pε0, λ
p0q, µp0qq Gpε0, exppbJ1q   λ
p0q, µp0qq,




































1 if p  1,
1 otherwise.
The initialization is such that:
λ
pεq
1,1  exppbJ1  bJ2q, µ
pεq
1,1  1,
K0pε0q  G0pε0, λ
p0q, µp0qq, (A.1)
K1pε0q  Gpε0, exppbJ1q   λ
p0q, µp0qq.
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Identifying first the terms a function of εJ2j, we have, for 0   p ¤ j:
λ
pεq



























and, using the convention that the product
±
p m¤j 1































p,j 1qKp1pε0q Gpε0, exppbJ1jq, 1qKjpε0q.






q   λp0q, µ
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in which we have set J  1  j  J¯   1 i.e. j  J  2  J¯  h  1 and h ¥ 2. Note that





































Gpε0   η¯  bJ¯ 1, 1, 1q

















































































































q   λp0q, µ
p0q
h q,
where we use the definition of µ
p0q
h from equation (A.2).
Because:
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Final Derivation We end up with considering that:

































because J  h  J¯   1. We can then write:
















; η¯, pbJkqp¤k¤hq, pbJk   η¯q1¤k¤p1q, pbk   η¯qk¥Jq
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 Cpη¯; η¯, pbJkqp¤k¤h, pbJk   η¯q1¤k¤p1, pbk   η¯qk¥Jqµ
p0q
h1.











h  Cp0; 0, pbkqk¥J¯ 1qµ
p0q
h .
To derive the likelihood Prpv1 ¥ ... ¥ vJ¯ ¥ v0 ¥ vJ¯ 1 ¥ ... ¥ vJ1 ¥ v0 ¥ vJ ¥ ... ¥ vJq, we
reconsider the backward induction as in the previous sections:







Cppbj; pbkqj¤k¤J¯ , η¯, pbJkqp¤k¤h, pbJk   η¯q1¤k¤p1, pbk   η¯qj¥Jq
,




Cpbm; ppbkqm¤k¤J¯q, η¯, pbJkqp¤k¤h, pbJk   η¯q1¤k¤p1, pbk   η¯qk¥Jq
ff






















Possible mistakes are checked by summing over all possible cases under different scenarios
of variables and coefficients and assessing that the sum of probabilities is equal to one. In an
additional note which is available upon request, cases for h  0, 1 and 2 are written directly,
and we have checked that the formula above applies as well. Cases h  0 and h  1 are
derived below.
h=0 We have by application of the above a single term p  h  1  1:



















h=1 We have by application of the above two terms p  1 and p  h  1  2:






Cpbm; ppbkqm¤k¤J¯q, η¯, bJ¯ 1, pbk   η¯qk¥Jq
ff





















Appendix D Counterfactual Analysis
D.1 Solving Equilibrium
This appendix specifies the algorithm to numerically solve an equilibrium under DA-T of
different degrees or DA-C with various marginal costs.
We begin with drawing Mp 4000q samples of size I (number of applicants) in which
random shocks to applicant preferences (ε
pmq
i ), to applicants’ final grades (ν
pmq
i ), and to
program preferences (ξ
pmq
i,j ) are generated. Using these simulated shocks as well as estimated
coefficients and observed characteristics, we compute applicant and program preferences,
both cardinal and ordinal; moreover, program preferences are translated into rankings over
applicants from 1 to I denoted by r
pmq
i,j , with larger r
pmq
i,j indicating being more preferred.
D.1.1 Solving Bayesian Nash Equilibrium under DA-T
For DA-T of degree K P t1, 2, . . . , 6u, we adopt an iterative process defined by index t
p 0, 1, . . .q:
• Initialization: We first initialize the cutoff distribution, Φ0. For each simulation sample
m:
(i) We let the matching outcome µpm,0q (artificially) be µˆDA, where µˆpDAq is the
applicant-optimal stable matching observed in our real data (i.e., the outcome
from DA as calculated in Section 4);
(ii) We then calculate the distribution of cutoffs Φ0 by setting the cutoff of each










0 if |µ1pm,0qpjq|   qj.
Because µpm,0q  µˆpDAq for all m, κ
pm,0q
j is constant across all simulation samples.
This leads to a degenerate distribution, Φ0.
We then calculate the simulated preferences of applicants and programs:
(i) We compute applicants’ cardinal and therefore ordinal preferences by inputting
the simulated shocks ε
pmq
i , estimated coefficients, and observed characteristics
into the utility functions specified in equations (1) and (2). Note that shocks to
applicant preferences (ε
pmq
i ) are drawn unconditionally on ordinal preferences
observed in the sample.
A.18
(ii) We also identify all ROLs tL
pmq
i,n un1,...,Ni for all i such that (a) L
pmq
i,n ranks no more
than K programs; (b) L
pmq
i,n is a partial order of the true preference order, i.e., the
programs included in L
pmq
i,n are ranked according to the true ordinal preferences;
and (c) L
pmq
i,n does not include any unacceptable or unqualified program. We only
need to focus on these ROLs to find an optimal ROL because all other ROLs are
strictly dominated (see Section 2).
(iii) We attribute to each program the same capacity as in the experiment and com-





i,j ), estimated coefficients, and observed first-semester grades into
the grade function (equation 5) and the latent score function (equation 4). These
preferences are then translated into rankings over applicants in increasing order
of preference from 1 to I, denoted by r
pmq
i,j .
• Iteration: For t P t1, 2, . . .u, given µm,t1 and pκpm,t1qj qjPJ for all m (i.e., Φt1),
iteration t goes through the following steps to find the optimal ROL for each applicant:
(i) Define A
pm,tq
i  tj P J : rpmqi,j ¥ κpm,t1qj u for each i and each m. That is, Apm,tqi
is the set of programs that have lower cutoffs in iteration t 1 than i’s ranks in
sample m.
(ii) Compute for each L
pmq















i,n -preferred in A
pl,tq
i u
Eη maxtxiβj   ε
pmq






in which the expectation is taken with respect to the ex-post shock, η, on the
outside option and “j is L
pmq
i,n -preferred in A
pl,tq
i ” is defined such that j is ranked





(iii) Find the optimal ROL L
pm,tq
i,  arg maxn1,...,NiW
pm,tq
i,n . If there are ties, we choose
the unique longest list among them. Given Assumption 3, there is always a
positive marginal benefit to apply to more programs, as long as the total number
applications is not more than K. Ties occur due to the discrete number of
simulations.
A.3This calculation amounts to assuming that i plays against a distribution of others’ actions (which is
approximated by their actions in iteration t  1 in all samples). Notice that i is present in every sample,
although ideally one could take i out. Besides, we use sample m also notwithstanding the introduction
of spurious correlation. These two simplifications speed up the computation, while the error introduced is
either Op1{nq or Op1{Mq and is therefore negligible.
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i,j for all applicants and programs, we run the DA algorithm
to find the new matching µpm,tq in each simulation sample.
(ii) We calculate the new cutoffs κ
pm,tq
j for all j based on µ
pm,tq and the difference













• Stopping rule: Stop when dptq is small enough.
Suppose that we stop at t  tf . This leads to a joint distribution of cutoffs across
simulation samples, tκ
pm,tf q
j u for all j and m, which is defined as Φe in the main text and
“describes” an equilibrium under DA-T-K.
Welfare computations. In counterfactual analysis, we use a different set of simula-
tion samples and also need to find best response for each applicant with given cardinal
preferences. Recall that ordinal preferences of applicants and programs are fixed at the value
observed in the experimental data (cf. Table 10). However, across the simulation samples
for counterfactual analysis, applicant cardinal preferences can differ. The procedure for
conditional drawings of preference shocks are detailed below in Appendix D.2.
Given the simulated cardinal preferences in a simulation sample (xiβj   εi,j for all j), i’s
best response under DA-T-K is found through the following steps:
(i) Given the equilibrium cutoff distribution solved above, tκ
pm,tf q
j u for all j and m, we
define A
pm,tf q
i  tj P J : rpmqi,j ¥ κpm,tf qj u for each i.
(ii) We identify all ROLs tL
pmq
i,n un1,...,Ni for all i such that (a) L
pmq
i,n ranks no more than K
programs; (b) L
pmq
i,n is a partial order of the true preference order; and (c) L
pmq
i,n does
not include any unacceptable or unqualified program.












tj is Lmi,n-preferred in A
pm,tf q
i u
Eη maxtxiβj   ε
pmq





where “j is Lmi,n-preferred in A
pm,tf q
i ” is defined such that j is ranked higher than j
1 for




(iv) i’s best response is the optimal ROL Lmi,  arg maxn1,...,NiW
ptf q
i,n . If there are ties, we
choose the unique longest list.
D.1.2 Solving Bayes-Nash equilibrium under DA-C
Similar to DA-T, equilibrium under DA-C also has to be solved as a fixed point. The




0 if |L| ¤ 1,
c|L| if |L| ¡ 1;
in which c is the constant marginal cost for second and later choices; and c can take one of
the 11 values in t105, 3.1 105, 104, 3.1 104, ..., 0.01, 0.31, 1u.
For a given c, we adopt an iterative process almost the same as the one for DA-T and












i,n |  1q,
which takes into account the application cost associated with L
pmq
i,n .
D.2 Simulating Preference Shocks: Conditional Drawings
Having solved equilibrium strategy numerically, we conduct counterfactual welfare analysis.
Our simulation experiment is to answer the following question: Had a counterfactual market
design been implemented at TSE in 2013, what is our best prediction of the counterfactual
outcome, based on all the information that is observed by the researcher?
Therefore, we take the observed applicant and program ordinal preferences as given,
although their cardinal preferences can vary while being compatible with the ordinal ones.
To simplify notations, we define vj  xβj   εj  bj   εj for j  1, 2, . . . , J , omitting the
index for applicants. Recall that v0  ε0. For a given applicant, write ε  pε0, ε1, . . . , εJq;
Lf is an extended rank-order list (i.e., an applicant’s submitted ROL under DA combined
with program acceptability). Define εj  pε0, . . . , εj1, εj 1, . . . , εJq and also the following
set:
SpLf q  tε P RJ 1 : ε is compatible with Lf given pbjqjPJ u.
This means that we draw the vector ε into the density function given by:




Note that the conditional distribution of εj given εj is given by:
fpεjq1tpεj, εjq P SpL
f qu
Prppεj, εjq P SpLf q | εjq
.
For j  0, the set pεj, εjq P SpL
f q given εj is an interval which can be open or not on the
left or on the right according to the following cases:
(i) Program j is ranked first and therefore if the second ranked is l, the only constraint
that SpLf q imposes on εj is :
bj   εj ¡ bl   εl.
(ii) Program j is ranked last and therefore if the before-the-last ranked is u, the only
constraint that SpLf q imposes on εj is :
bj   εj   bu   εu.
(iii) If program j has two neighbors, from below, l and from above u, then the only con-
straint is:
bl   εl   bj   εj   bu   εu.
For j  0, the set pε0, ε0q P SpL
f q is slightly more complicated but follows the same
principles. Suppose the ranking of programs is given by p1, . . . , J, O, J   1, . . . , O, J, . . . , Jq.
It translates into the set of inequalities on ε0:
bJ   εJ ¡ η¯   ε0 ¡ bJ 1   εJ 1,
bJ1   εJ1 ¡ ε0 ¡ bJ   εJ ,
using the conventions that b0   8 and bJ 1  8. This means that:
ε0 P

maxpbJ 1   εJ 1  η¯, bJ   εJq,minpbJ   εJ  η¯, bJ1   εJ1q

,
and the interval is not empty since ε P SpLf q.
Defining all these domain intervals as Ijpεj, L
f q, the conditional distribution of εj given
εj and L
f is given by:
fpεjq1tεj P Ijpεj, L
f qu
Prpεj P Ijpεj, Lf q | εjq
.
It is easy to simulate since F pεjq  expp exppεjqq and therefore for δ P p0, 1q:
F1pδq   logp logpδqq.
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Assume that Ijpεj, L
f q  rajpεjq, bjpεjqs and draw u Ur0,1s then:
εj   logp logpF pajpεjqq   upF pbjpεjqq  F pajpεjqqqq (A.4)
is distributed as εj given εj and L
f .
For Gibbs sampling, the Markov chain that we use is the following:
(i) Draw ε
p0q
0 in the type-I extreme value distribution.
(a) Above O, draw ε
p0q
j sequentially in the reverse order of 1, . . . , J imposing the
constraints sequentially:
bJ   εJ ¡ η¯   ε0, bJ1   εJ1 ¡ bJ   εJ , etc.
(b) Between O and O, draw ε
p0q
j sequentially in the order of J  1, . . . , J 1 imposing
the constraints sequentially:
η¯   ε0 ¡ bJ 1   εJ 1 ¡ ε0, bJ 1   εJ 1 ¡ bJ 2   εJ 2 ¡ ε0, etc.
(c) Below O, draw ε
p0q
j sequentially in the order of J, . . . , J imposing the constraints
sequentially:
ε0 ¡ bJ   εJ , bJ   εJ ¡ bJ 1   εJ 1, etc.
In this way, εp0q P SpLf q.
(ii) For t  t1, 2, . . .u, repeat the steps in which ε
ptq
0 is drawn according to equation (A.4)
given ε
pt1q
0 , and then follow the same order for drawing ε
ptq
j as in steps (ia) to (ic) that
is the order of drawings given by:
J, . . . , 1, J   1, . . . , J ;
in the meantime, impose the exact intervals Ijpεj, L
f q. Note that at every step, the
ε of interest belongs to SpLf q since we draw in the correct intervals.
(iii) If the chain is long enough, then the distribution of ε is the distribution of interest and
expectations of all εj can be approximated.
A.23
D.3 Counterfactual Analysis of Cardinal Welfare
D.3.1 Applicants Cardinal Welfare
Table D.2 provides an evaluation based on the estimated cardinal preferences while ex-
plicitly taking into account the application costs. For each given market design, we first
calculate cardinal welfare per applicant in each simulation sample and then measure its
mean and standard deviation across all simulation samples. When doing so, we ignore the
“strategizing” cost that an applicant has to incur to find an optimal ROL.
Panel A first presents per-applicant cardinal welfare across the DA-T of different degrees
under which an applicant can submit a limited number of choices. The results confirm
Figure 4 and show that DA-T-6 to DA-T-4 achieve the exact DA outcome, while DA-T-3
incurs a small welfare loss. Surprisingly, DA-T-2 obtains a welfare gain that is comparable
to re-assigning 1.5 applicants from an “almost” unacceptable program to an “almost” defi-
nitely acceptable one (see Section 5.5.1 for a discussion on this cardinality measure). This
outcome occurs even though DA-T-2 leaves 0.86 applicants unmatched on average, as par-
tially reflected in the increase in the standard deviation of applicant welfare. DA-T-1 brings
the lowest applicant welfare with the highest variance, consistent with the large number
of unmatched applicants (4.56). Relative to DA, the welfare loss in DA-T-1 is compara-
ble to moving 2.9 applicants from an almost unacceptable program to an almost definitely
acceptable one.
The analysis of DA-C can also be found in Panel A of Table D.2. In addition to describ-
ing the per-applicant welfare produced by matching outcomes, we also report the application
costs paid by applicants and their net welfare. In terms of matching outcomes, per-applicant
welfare has a non-linear relationship with application cost: Welfare increases with the ap-
plication cost when the cost is not too high (¤ 0.31), but it drops to the lowest when it
is prohibitively high ( 1). In contrast, the standard deviation of per-applicant welfare
monotonically increases with cost, consistent with the monotonically increasing number of
unmatched applicants.
Among all DA-T and DA-C configurations, the maximum welfare gain relative to DA
is obtained for DA-C with a cost 0.31, equivalent to re-assigning 5.8 applicants from an
almost unacceptable program to an almost definitely acceptable one. The largest welfare
loss (under DA-T-1) amounts to moving 1.1 applicants from an almost definitely acceptable
program to an almost unacceptable one.
The costs actually paid by applicants follow the same pattern as the welfare. Applicants
pay higher costs when the cost increases but remains moderate, and they stop applying to
additional programs once the cost is prohibitively high. The maximum costs are paid when
the marginal cost is 0.31: The magnitude is equivalent to re-assigning 7.8 applicants from
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an almost definitely acceptable program to an almost unacceptable one.
As discussed earlier, we can consider the application cost as a transfer from applicants to
programs, e.g., a transfer of monetary fees. Nonetheless, one may be interested in applicants’
net welfare, given the application cost they pay. Panel A of Table D.2 shows that the net
welfare is monotonically decreasing in application cost. Relative to DA, the maximum
welfare loss (at marginal cost  1) amounts to re-assigning 2.5 applicants from an almost
definitely acceptable program to an almost unacceptable one, which is still slightly lower
than the loss under DA-T-1.
Table D.2: Cardinal Welfare per Applicant under Different Market Designs
DA-T of diff. degrees DA-C w/ diff. marginal application costc
Welfare per app.
Marginal cost
Welfare per app. Costs paid Net welfare
mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d.
A. Counterfactual Analysisa
DA 3.2489 0.1064 0 (DA) 3.2489 0.1064 0 0 3.2489 0.1064
DA-T-6 3.2489 0.1064 0.00001 3.2489 0.1064 0.0000 0.0000 3.2489 0.1064
DA-T-5 3.2489 0.1064 0.000031 3.2489 0.1064 0.0000 0.0000 3.2488 0.1064
DA-T-4 3.2489 0.1064 0.0001 3.2489 0.1064 0.0001 0.0000 3.2488 0.1064
DA-T-3 3.2479 0.1064 0.00031 3.2490 0.1064 0.0004 0.0000 3.2486 0.1064
DA-T-2 3.2558 0.1070 0.001 3.2492 0.1064 0.0010 0.0001 3.2482 0.1064
DA-T-1 3.2328 0.1136 0.0031 3.2499 0.1065 0.0025 0.0003 3.2475 0.1064
0.01 3.2522 0.1065 0.0061 0.0009 3.2461 0.1065
0.031 3.2594 0.1068 0.0134 0.0028 3.2460 0.1068
0.1 3.2721 0.1083 0.0292 0.0092 3.2430 0.1086
0.31 3.2806 0.1103 0.0425 0.0294 3.2381 0.1135
1 3.2426 0.1136 0.0075 0.0950 3.2351 0.1477
B. In the Experimentb
DA-T-4 3.2494 0.1061 DA-C 3.2409 0.1061 - - - -
Notes: The counterfactual simulation is the same as that in Table 12; the notes therein provide more details. In each of
the 4000 simulation samples, we first calculate the number of applicants who are better off (or worse off) relative to the DA
outcome, which is the applicant-optimal stable matching. The table then reports the means and standard deviations of these
two ordinal welfare measures under a given market design across simulation samples.
In summary, Panel A confirms that the welfare loss due to application costs (in the form
of DA-T or DA-C) is negligible when the cost is low. Moreover, combined with Figure 4,
DA-C appears to be a better choice than DA-T: We can set the marginal cost as high as
0.01 so that there is almost no loss in match quality, and the number of candidates screened
is 1.44 per opening. To reach a comparable screening cost, DA-T has to be of degree 2
(DA-T-2), under which programs screen 1.75 candidates per opening and 0.86 applicants
are unmatched.
Panel B of Table D.2 evaluates the cardinal welfare of the game play observed in the
experiment. To simulate these results, we hold constant applicants’ actions across the 4000
simulation samples. DA-T-4 reaches almost identical welfare levels both in equilibrium and
in the experiment. However, DA-C in the experiment has a different cost configuration from
that in the counterfactual. In fact, DA-C in the experiment is the same as DA-T-3 plus
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a cost for additional choices, and therefore, the former should weakly dominate DA-T-3.
While this prediction is true in simulations of equilibrium outcomes, it is not true in the
actual game played.A.4 The welfare loss is due largely to the unmatched applicant under
DA-C in the experiment, which may be explained by the fact that applicant actions, which
are held constant across simulation samples, can be suboptimal in some samples. Moreover,
this loss may indicate that applicants do not use equilibrium strategies in the experiment.
D.3.2 Program Cardinal Welfare
Similar to the analysis of applicants’ cardinal welfare, we first study per-program welfare
(Table D.3). Recall that this welfare analysis does not consider screening costs.
Table D.3: Programs’ Cardinal Welfare under Different Market Designs




Def. 1: Grades Def. 2: Rank Def. 1: Grades Def. 2: Rank
Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d.
A. Counterfactual Analysis
DA 226.10 0 1456.14 0 0 (DA) 226.10 0 1456.14 0
DA-T-6 226.10 0.00 1456.14 0.00 0.00001 226.10 0.00 1456.14 0.00
DA-T-5 226.10 0.00 1456.14 0.00 0.000031 226.10 0.00 1456.14 0.00
DA-T-4 226.10 0.00 1456.14 0.00 0.0001 226.10 0.00 1456.14 0.10
DA-T-3 225.85 0.55 1455.63 1.03 0.00031 226.10 0.00 1456.14 0.33
DA-T-2 224.83 0.52 1453.44 1.18 0.001 226.10 0.02 1456.12 0.52
DA-T-1 219.49 2.37 1435.68 11.38 0.0031 226.10 0.05 1456.06 0.96
0.01 226.09 0.10 1455.92 1.50
0.031 225.90 0.55 1454.52 4.09
0.1 224.02 1.21 1444.81 7.35
0.31 222.77 1.61 1442.72 8.55
1 220.17 2.30 1436.83 10.57
B. In the Experiment
DA-T 226.10 0 1448.14 0 DA-C 224.63 0 1445.43 0
Notes: The counterfactual simulation is the same as that in Table D.2; the notes therein provide more details. In each of
the 4000 simulation samples, we first calculate the per-program welfare according to two measures. The first is the sum of
final grades of all applicants matched with the given program, and the second is the sum of matched applicants’ rankings
by the program (129 points if matched with the top-ranked applicant, 1 point if matched with the lowest-ranked applicant).
The table then reports the mean and standard deviation of these two welfare measures under a given market design across
simulation samples. The standard deviation is zero for program welfare under DA, DA-T and DT-C in the experiment because
there is no variation in matching outcomes across simulation samples.
A clear pattern evident in Table D.3 is that program welfare decreases when application
costs increase under either DA-T or DA-C. This pattern is explained mainly by the number
of unmatched applicants. If an average applicant – with a final grade of 12.27 and ranked
by the program as 65th – becomes unmatched, the per-program welfare decreases by 1.75
A.4When simulating the experimental configuration of DA-C, almost no applicants rank more than three
choices, even when the cost is negligible. Therefore, this simulation leads to the same outcome as DA-T-3,
which obtains (almost) the same outcome as DA.
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or 9.29, according to the two welfare measures, respectively. For example, under DA-T-
1, 4.11 applicants on average are unmatched (Figure 4), which leads to a welfare loss of
approximately 7 or 38. The actual loss is smaller because unmatched applicants tend to
have lower final grades and/or to be ranked lower by programs.
Nonetheless, Table D.3 shows that the loss in program welfare is negligible when the
application cost is low. Even in the extreme, under DA-T-1 or DA-C with a marginal cost
equal to one, on average, the loss to a program’s welfare amounts to losing an applicant
with a final grade ranging from 5.93 to 6.61 or one ranked 109th. On the other hand, the
standard deviation indicates that the effect on program welfare varies more significantly
across simulation samples when the application cost increases.
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Appendix E Screen Shots from the Web Site for the
Experiment
(a) Top Part of the Screen
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Search courses Sub
Choosing Your M2 Program
As the first year of your master’s program 
has ended, it is time for you to choose an M2 
program to continue your education at TSE.  
The online application system is open from 
June 12, 0:00 to June 18, 12:00 (noon).  
 
Choose Your M2 Program and Help TSE 
Improve the Matching Process 
Please note that you will be asked to submit 
four (4) rank-order lists each of which is 
under a specific mechanism. The four (4) 
mechanisms are well-known and will be 
explained in detail during the application 
process. For the final assignment, only one 
of them will be chosen, and to the best of our 
knowledge, we believe that every 
mechanism has an almost equal probability 
to be chosen. We guarantee that every 
Choisissez votre programme de M2
Comme l’année de M1 touche à sa fin, il est 
temps pour vous de choisir les programmes 
de M2 auxquels vous souhaitez candidater.
Les candidatures se feront sur internet entre 
le 12 juin à 0h00 et le 18 juin à 12h00 
(midi).
Choisissez votre programme de M2 et 
aidez TSE à améliorer ses procédures de 
sélections.  
Avant tout, veuillez noter que nous vous 
demandons d’inscrire quatre (4) listes de 
choix, chaque liste s’appliquera à un 
mécanisme d’allocation différent. Les quatre 
(4) mécanismes utilisés sont bien connus en 
théorie économique et seront expliqués en 
détail durant la procédure d’assignation. 
Pour l’assignation finale des étudiants dans 
Choix des programmes M2
The application system has been closed. 
Submissions after June 18, 12:00 will not 
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(b) Middle Part of the Screen (c) Bottom Part of the Screen
student is treated equally and always faces 
the same rules.  
 
TSE completely understands that trying four 
mechanisms imposes an additional cost on 
all of you. We would have chosen just one of 
them had we known which of them would be 
the best for you and TSE. Even from the 
frontier of economic research, we do not 
have the answer. We do not want to pick a 
random mechanism that will end up with a 
bad outcome. We therefore ask for some 
sacrifice from you, so that in the future, we 
can improve our application system.  
 
TSE appreciates your understanding and 
your contribution!  
 
Standard Track and Doctoral Track 
This year, students apply to M2 programs 
first without indicating standard or doctoral 
track, and programs will accept students 
without considering track assignment.  
 
After everyone is assigned to a M2 program, 
if you want to be considered by the doctoral 
track of your assigned M2 program, you will 
have the chance to contact the director. If 
your application is not approved by the 
director, or if you do not do anything, you 
stay in the standard track of your assigned 
program. 
 
Only Your Last Submitted Rank-Order 
Lists Matters 
After you submit your rank-order lists, you 
may come back to the system before it 
closes and submit new lists. In that case, 
only your rank-order lists that are submitted 
at the latest time will be taken into account in 
les masters, seul un des 4 mécanismes sera 
retenu. A priori, les quatre mécanismes ont 
les mêmes chances d’être retenu. Nous 
garantissons que chaque étudiant sera traité 
de façon identique et fera face aux mêmes 
règles de sélection. 
TSE a conscience que considérer quatre 
mécanismes vous impose un coût 
supplémentaire. Si nous avions su quel 
mécanisme était le meilleur pour TSE et pour 
vous, nous n’en aurions sélectionné qu’un. 
Cependant, la recherche économique ignore 
encore quel mécanisme est le meilleur et 
nous ne souhaitons pas en choisir un au 
hasard qui donnerait de mauvais résultats. 
C’est pourquoi nous vous demandons ce 
sacrifice afin que dans l’avenir nous 
puissions améliorer notre système de 
candidature.
TSE vous remercie de votre compréhension 
et de votre contribution. 
Voie Standard et Voie Doctorale 
Cette année, les étudiants postulent dans les 
programmes de Master sans préciser s'ils 
souhaitent suivre le parcours standard ou la 
voie doctorale. Dans un premier temps, les 
programmes accepteront les étudiants sans 
tenir compte de la voie.
Après que vous avez été assigné à un 
programme de Master et si vous souhaitez 
rejoindre la voie doctorale de votre Master 
d’assignation, vous pourrez contacter le 
directeur de votre master. Si votre directeur 
de Master refuse de vous accepter en voie 
doctorale ou si vous n’effectuez aucune 
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the assignment process. 
 
Your Privacy 
The information you input here will only be 
used for research purposes to improve the 
matching procedure, and your identity will 
only be revealed to the TSE researchers and 
administrative staff who are directly involved 
in this assignment procedure. In particular, 
program directors will not be given the 
information about your rank-order lists.  
 
Have Questions or Need Some Help 
You may send an email to: scoltsem2@ut-
capitole.fr. 
 
In the following, we ask you to fill out some 
forms step-by-step.
To continue to Step 1, please click here. 
Seul votre dernier choix compte
Après avoir enregistrer vos choix, vous 
pourrez toujours recommencer la procédure 
et enregistrer de nouveau choix. Dans ce 
cas, seul le dernier choix enregistré sera pris 
en compte. 
 
Données et informations privées  
Les informations que vous donnerez durant 
cette expérimentation seront utilisées 
uniquement à des fins de recherche et ceci 
afin de déterminer la meilleure procédure 
d’appariement étudiant/Master2. Votre 
identité sera révélée uniquement aux 
chercheurs et membres du personnel 
administratif directement impliqués dans la 
procédure d’appariement. En particulier, les 
directeurs de programmes n'auront pas 
accès à l'information sur vos choix. 
 
Si vous avez des questions  
Vous pouvez envoyer un mail à : 
scoltsem2@ut-capitole.fr. 
 
Nous allons maintenant vous guider étape 
par étape.  
Pour commencer l’étape 1, veuillez cliquer 
ici. 
Last modified: Thursday, July 25, 2013, 3:13 PM
http://cours.ut-capitole.fr/mod/page/view.php?id=8818
Figure E.1: First Screen: Welcome Page of the Experiment
Notes: This is the first screen an applicant sees when participating in the experiment. It shows, in both English and French,
(1) the purpose of the experiment (i.e., trying four mechanisms instead of adopting only one mechanism), (2) some information
about the process (deadline, change application during the process, etc.), and (3) the link to the next step. This screen is the
same for every applicant, except that the link to the next screen is randomized.
A.28
(a) Part I of the Screen (b) Part II of the Screen
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Step 1: Unacceptables
Step 1: Are there any M2 programs which do not fit your interests? 
 
Before you start, it is very important for you to know your own interests and to know more about the M2 programs offered by 
TSE.  
 
Information on the M2 Programs: 
You may find a description of the seven programs here. It also provides each program's minimal requirements and tentative 
quota (number of seats).  
 
Please make sure whether there is any program that does not fit your interests. In other words, if you were assigned to one 
of such programs, you would rather leave TSE to pursue other possibilities. 
 
To facilitate your decision making, we would like to ask you the following questions.  
 
Please note that your answers to the following questions will not be used in the admission process and will not 
affect your possible study at TSE in the future.  
 
Please choose one and only one of the three answers for each question. 
 
 
Etape 1 : Y a-t-il des programmes de M2 qui ne vous intéressent pas? 
 
En premier lieu, il est important que vous connaissiez vos centres d’intérêts et vos préférences envers les différents M2 
offerts par TSE.  
 
Information sur les programmes de M2:  
Vous pouvez trouver les descriptions et informations sur les programmes de M2 en cliquant ici. Ces liens fournissent 
également des informations sur les prérequis de chaque programme ainsi que le nombre de places disponibles dans chacun 
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des M2 (ces nombres sont toutefois provisoires).  
 
Veuillez en particulier vous demander si certains programmes M2 ne vous intéressent pas, au point que vous préféreriez 
quitter TSE si vous y étiez affecté.  
 
Afin de faciliter votre choix, veuillez répondre aux questions suivantes:  
 
Nous vous rappelons que vos réponses durant ce test n’affecteront en aucune façon vos futures études à TSE !  
 
Vous ne pouvez inscrire qu'une seule réponse aux questions suivantes. 
1
If you are accepted (and only accepted) by "Economics of Markets and Organizations 
(EMO)", will you stay at TSE and register for the program in September 2013? 
 
Si vous étiez seulement accepté dans le M2 “Economie des Marchés et des 
Organisations (EMO)”, resteriez-vous à TSE en Septembre 2013? 
Yes/Oui 
No/Non 
I Don't Know/Je Ne Sais Pas 
2
If you are accepted (and only accepted) by "Environmental and Natural Resources 
Economics (ERNA)", will you stay at TSE and register for the program in September 
2013? 
 
Si vous étiez seulement accepté dans le M2 “Economie de l'environnement et des 
ressources naturelles (ERNA)”, resteriez-vous à TSE en Septembre 2013? 
Yes/Oui 
No/Non 
I Don't Know/Je Ne Sais Pas 
3
If you are accepted (and only accepted) by "Economics and Competition Law (ECL)”, 
will you stay at TSE and register for the program in September 2013? 
 
Si vous étiez seulement accepté dans le M2 "Economie et Droit de la Concurrence 
(ECL)", resteriez-vous à TSE en Septembre 2013 ? 
Yes/Oui 
No/Non 







(c) Part III of the Screen (d) Part IV of the Screen
If you are accepted (and only accepted) by "Financial markets and intermediaries (MIF)", 
will you stay at TSE and register for the program in September 2013? 
 
Si vous étiez seulement accepté dans le M2 “Marchés et Intermédiaires Financiers 
(MIF)”, resteriez-vous à TSE en Septembre 2013 ? 
Yes/Oui 
No/Non 
I Don't Know/Je Ne Sais Pas 
5
If you are accepted (and only accepted) by "Development Economics and Public 
Policies (PPD) ", will you stay at TSE and register for the program in September 2013? 
 
Si vous étiez seulement accepté dans le M2 ”Politique Publique et Développement 
(PPD)”, resteriez-vous à TSE en Septembre 2013 ?
Yes/Oui 
No/Non 
I Don't Know/Je Ne Sais Pas 
6
If you are accepted (and only accepted) by "Statistics and Econometrics (STA)", will you 
stay at TSE and register for the program in September 2013? 
 
Si vous étiez seulement accepté dans le M2 ” Statistique et Econométrie (STA)”, 
resteriez-vous à TSE en Septembre 2013?
Yes/Oui 
No/Non 
I Don't Know/Je Ne Sais Pas 
7
If you are accepted (and only accepted) by "Economic theory and econometrics 
(ECOMATH)", will you stay at TSE and register for the program in September 2013? 
 
Si vous étiez seulement accepté dans le M2 ”Economie Mathématique et Econométrie 
(ECOMATH)”, resteriez-vous à TSE en Septembre 2013?
Yes/Oui 
No/Non 
I Don't Know/Je Ne Sais Pas 
Before submitting your answers, we suggest that you write down your answers on a piece of paper. To 
continue to Step 2, please click on "Envoyer le questionnaire" (Submit questionnaire).  
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Avant d'enregistrer vos réponses, nous vous suggérons d'écrire vos réponses sur une feuille de papier. Pour 
commencer l’étape 2, veuillez cliquer "Envoyer le questionnaire". 
----- Page Break ----- 
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Figure E.2: Second Screen: Survey on Program Acceptability
Notes: This is the second screen an applicant sees when participating in the experiment. It provides, in both English and French,
(1) a survey on program acceptability, (2) explanations that the survey answers are not used in the assignment mechanism,
and (3) the link to the program descriptions and the link to the next step. The content of the screen is the same for every
applicant, but the order of survey questions (i.e., the order of the programs) and the link to the next step are randomized.
Therefore, applicants play the four mechanisms in a randomized order.
A.29
(a) Top Part of the Screen
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Choix des programmes M2
Step 2: DA
1
Step 2: Please Rank the M2 Programs 
 
Scenario: Deferred Acceptance mechanism 
Please rank the seven M2 programs offered by TSE using the form at the bottom of the 
page.  
 
Your rank order list submitted here will be used to calculate your assignment if and only if 
the Deferred Acceptance algorithm is chosen to be the matching procedure. 
We guarantee that all M1 students face the same rules in this procedure.  
 
Based on well-known scientific research results, we make the following suggestions: 
1. It is in your best interest to tell us your TRUE preferences, regardless of the 
probability of being accepted. 
2. If there are any programs in which you are absolutely not interested (and you 
answered "No" in the first step), it is always optimal to put them at the bottom of 
your ranking.
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(b) Middle Part of the Screen (c) Bottom Part of the Screen
Even if you think you may not meet the program’s requirements, it is still optimal for 
you to include it in your rank order list.  
 
More information:
1. Details of the Deferred Acceptance mechanism 
2. Description of the programs and their requirements 
 
Etape 2 : Veuillez classer les programmes de M2
Scenario: Mécanisme d’acceptation différée
Veuillez classer les sept programmes de M2 proposés par TSE en utilisant le tableau ci-
dessous.
Les classements enregistrés sur cette page seront utilisées pour calculer le programme 
auquel vous serez assigné, si et seulement si le mécanisme d’acceptation différée est 
retenu pour déterminer la répartition des étudiants au sein des programmes de M2. Nous 
garantissons que dans ce mécanisme, l’ensemble des étudiants de M1 font face aux 
mêmes conditions d’acceptation.
Le mécanisme d’acceptation différée a été largement étudié scientifiquement. Deux 
résultats importants prouve ：  
1. Il est dans votre intérêt d’inscrire vos VERITABLES préférences, indépendamment 
des probabilités que vous soyez accepté.
2. S'il y a des programmes de master qui ne vous intéressent pas (auxquels vous 
avez répondu "non" durant l'étape numéro un), il est optimal de les classer en 
dernier dans votre liste de choix.
Même si vous pensez que vous pourriez ne pas satisfaire les prérequis du 
programme, il est toujours optimal pour vous de l'inclure dans votre classement des 
programmes.
Vous pouvez obtenir davantage d’informations grâce aux liens suivants : 
1. Mécanisme d’acceptation différée 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Economie Mathématique et Econométrie - Economic 
Theory and Econometrics (ECOMATH) 
Politique Publique et Développement - Development 
Economics and Public Policies (PPD) 
Statistique et Econométrie - Statistitics and 
Econometrics (STA) 
Economie des marchés et des organisations - 
Economics of Markets & Organizations (EMO) 
Economie de l'environnement et des ressources 
naturelles - Environmental and Natural Resources 
Economics (ERNA) 
Economie et Droit de la Concurrence - Economics 
and Competition Law (ECL) 
Marchés et Intermédiaires financiers - Financial 
Markets and Intermediaries (MIF) 
In the above form, "1" means your number 1 choice, "2" means number 2, and so on.  
Dans le tableau précédent, le programme classé "1" correspond à votre choix numéro 1, le programme classé "2" 
correspond à votre choix numéro 2, etc. 
----- Page Break ----- 
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Figure E.3: The Deferred-Acceptance Mechanism
Notes: This is the screen where an applicant submits her application under the Deferred-Acceptance mechanism. It presents,
in both English and French, (1) explanations that the application is used if and only if the Deferred-Acceptance mechanism
is chosen, (2) some tips that can be derived from the literature, (3) the links to the pages describing the mechanism and the
programs, and (4) the programs that each applicant can rank. This screen is the same for every applicant, except that (1) the
link to the next screen is randomized, (2) the order of the programs presented is randomized, and (3) each applicant may reach
this screen at different stage in the experiment.
A.30
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Step 2: Please Rank the M2 Programs
 
Scenario: Deferred Acceptance mechanism with motivation letters. 
Please rank the seven programs using the form at the bottom of the page. Please note that you have to write a 
motivation letter for your choices 4, 5, 6, and 7, if you decide to rank more than 3 programs.  
 
Your rank order list submitted here will be used to calculate your assignment if and only if the Deferred Acceptance 
mechanism, where motivation letters are required, is chosen to be the matching procedure. 
We guarantee that all M1 students face the same rules in this procedure. 
We think that "Actions speak louder than words". Therefore, we do not ask you to write letters for your top three choices.  
Based on well-known scientific research results, we make the following suggestions:
1. If you do not mind writing motivation letters, it is in your best interest to rank more programs and rank them 
according to your true preferences.
2. If there are any programs in which you are absolutely not interested (and you 
answered "No" in the first step), it is always optimal to put them at the bottom of 
your ranking or not to rank them.
3. Among those programs that are ranked by you, it is optimal to rank them according to your true preference order.  
4. A recommended decision process may be:
(i) Identify your true preferences ranking over all 7 programs;  
(ii) Assess the probability of being accepted by each program;
(iii) Find the programs that balance your preferences, the costs of writing motivation letters, and the 
probabilities that you are accepted by them;  
(iv) Rank these programs according to your true preferences. 
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More information:  
1. Details of the deferred acceptance mechanism 
2. Description of the programs and their requirements
 
Etape 2 : Veuillez classer les programmes de M2
Scénario: Mécanisme d’acceptation différée avec lettre de motivation.
Veuillez classer les sept programmes de master 2 proposés par TSE en utilisant le tableau ci-dessous. Si vous choisissez 
de classer plus de 3 programmes, vous devez écrire une lettre de motivation pour les choix 4, 5, 6 et 7.  
 
Les choix reportés sur cette page seront utilisés pour déterminer le programme auquel vous serez assigné, si et seulement 
si le mécanisme d’acceptation différée avec lettre de motivation est retenu pour déterminer l’allocation des étudiants au sein 
des programmes de M2. 
Nous garantissons que l’ensemble des étudiants de Master1 font face aux mêmes conditions d’acceptation par ce 
mécanisme.  
Nous pensons que vos choix révèlent davantage vos préférences que vos paroles, c'est pourquoi nous ne vous demandons 
pas d'écrire de lettre de motivation pour vos trois premiers choix.
Le mécanisme d’acceptation différée avec lettre de motivation est étudié par la théorie économique. Au vu des résultats de 
la recherche, nous vous conseillons de prendre en considération les points suivants :  
 
1. Si écrire des lettres de motivations ne vous dérange pas, il est préférable de classer le plus de programmes 
possible, et de les classer dans l’ordre de vos vraies préférences.
2. S'il y a des programmes dans lesquels vous ne souhaitez pas postuler (et auxquels vous avez répondu "Non" 
durant la première étape), il est toujours optimal de les classer en bas de votre liste de choix.
3. Toutefois, parmi les programmes que vous retenez, il est recommandé de les classer en fonction de vos vraies 
préférences. 
4. Nous vous recommandons le processus de décision suivant :
(i) Déterminer vos vraies préférences parmi les 7 programmes.
(ii) Estimez la probabilité d’être accepté dans chacun des 7 programmes.
(iii) Choisissez les programmes en fonction de vos préférences, de vos probabilités d’être accepté, et de ce 
qu’il vous coûte d’écrire des lettres de motivation. 
(iv) Classez ces programmes dans l’ordre de vos vraie préférences.
 
Plus d’information : 
1. Informations sur le mécanisme d’acceptation différée. 
2. Description des programmes de master 2 et des prérequis pour postuler.
1 2 3
Economie Mathématique et Econométrie - Economic Theory and Econometrics 
(ECOMATH) 
Politique Publique et Développement - Development Economics and Public Policies (PPD) 
Statistique et Econométrie - Statistitics and Econometrics (STA) 
Economie des marchés et des organisations - Economics of Markets & Organizations 
(EMO) 
Economie de l'environnement et des ressources naturelles - Environmental and Natural 
Resources Economics (ERNA) 






(c) Part III of the Screen (d) Part IV of the Screen
Marchés et Intermédiaires financiers - Financial Markets and Intermediaries (MIF) 
In the above form, "1" means your number 1 choice, "2" means number 2, and so on.  
Dans le tableau précédent, le programme classé "1" correspond à votre choix numéro 1, le programme classé "2" 
correspond à votre choix numéro 2, etc. 
2
What is your choice number 4 - Quel est votre choix numéro 4 ?
Choose...
3
Please explain your motivation for this choice - Veuillez expliquer vos motivations pour ce choix. 
 
If you do not want to apply to a fourth choice, write "NA" - Si vous ne souhaitez pas postuler à un quatrième programme de 
master 2, inscrivez "NA" 
4
What is your choice number 5 - Quel est votre choix numéro 5 ?
Choose...
5
Please explain your motivation for this choice - Veuillez expliquer vos motivations pour ce choix. 
 
If you do not want to apply to a fifth choice, write "NA" - Si vous ne souhaitez pas postuler à un cinquième programme de 
master 2, inscrivez "NA" 
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9
Please explain your motivation for this choice - Veuillez expliquer vos motivations pour ce choix. 
 
If you do not want to apply to a seventh choice, write "NA" - Si vous ne souhaitez pas postuler à un septième programme de 
master 2, inscrivez "NA" 
----- Page Break ----- 
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Figure E.4: The Deferred-Acceptance Mechanism with Costs
Notes: This is the screen where an applicant submits her application under the Deferred-Acceptance mechanism with costs (in
terms of writing a motivation letter). Part of the screen, between parts III and IV is omitted in the figure, but the information
on that part is a continuation of that on part III. It presents, in both English and French, (1) explanations that the application
is used if and only if the Deferred-Acceptance mechanism with costs is chosen, (2) some tips that can be derived from the
literature, (3) the links to the pages describing the mechanism and the programs, and (4) the programs that each applicant
can rank. This screen is the same for every applicant, except that (1) the link to the next screen is randomized, (2) the order
of the programs presented is randomized, and (3) each applicant may reach this screen at different stage in the experiment.
A.31
(a) Top Part of the Screen
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Step 2: Please Rank the M2 Programs
Scenario: Deferred Acceptance mechanism where you rank only 4 
programs. 
 
Please rank the 7 M2 programs using the form at the bottom of the page. Please note that 
you are only allowed to rank 4 programs.  
 
Your rank order list submitted here will be used to calculate your assignment if and only if 
the so-called Deferred Acceptance mechanism, where everyone is allowed to rank up to 
4 programs, is chosen to be the matching procedure. We guarantee that all M1 students 
face the same rules in this procedure.  
 
Based on well-known scientific research results, we make the following suggestions: 
1. It may not be optimal to report your true preferences. 
2. If there are any programs in which you are absolutely not interested (and you 
answered "No" in the first step), it is always optimal to put them at the bottom of 
your ranking or not to rank them. 
3. You are recommended to take into account the likelihood that you are accepted by 
each program. 
4. Among those programs that you rank, it is optimal to rank them according to your 
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(b) Middle Part of the Screen (c) Bottom Part of the Screen
true preference order. 
5. A recommended decision process may be:  
(i) Identify your true preferences ranking over all 7 programs;  
(ii) Assess the probability of being accepted by each program;  
(iii) Find the four programs that balance your preferences and the probabilities 
that you are accepted by them; 
(iv) Rank these four programs according to your true preferences.  
More information:  
1. Details of the deferred acceptance mechanism 
2. Description of the programs and their requirements
 
Etape 2 : Veuillez classer les programmes de M2
Scenario: Mécanisme d’acceptation différée dans lequel seuls 4 
programmes peuvent être classés.  
 
Veuillez indiquer 4 choix parmi les 7 programmes de M2 proposés par TSE. 
 
Les choix reportés sur cette page seront utilisés pour dériver le programme auquel vous 
serez assigné, si et seulement si le mécanisme d’acceptation différée (dans lesquels seuls 
quatre programmes peuvent être classés) est retenu pour déterminer l’allocation des 
étudiants au sein des programmes de M2. Nous garantissons que l’ensemble des étudiants 
de M1 font face aux mêmes conditions d’acceptation par ce mécanisme.  
 
Le mécanisme d’acceptation différée avec contraintes (sur le nombre de candidatures) est 
étudié par la théorie économique. Au vu des résultats de la recherche, nous vous 
rappelons les points suivants :  
1. Il peut ne pas être optimal de reporter vos véritables préférences. 
2. S'il y a des programmes dans lesquels vous ne souhaitez pas postuler (et auxquels vous avez répondu "Non" 
durant la première étape), il est toujours optimal de les classer en bas de votre liste de choix. 
3. Il est recommandé de tenir compte de la probabilité (que vous estimez) d’être 
accepté dans chaque programme.  
4. Toutefois, parmi les programmes que vous retenez, il est recommandé de les 
classer en fonction de vos véritables préférences.  
5. Nous vous recommandons le processus de décision suivant : 
i) Déterminer vos vraies préférences parmi les 7 programmes. 
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iii) Choisissez les 4 programmes en fonction de vos préférences et de vos 
probabilités d’être accepté.  
iv) Classez ces quatre programmes dans l’ordre de vos vraies préférences.
 
Plus d’informations.  
1. Information sur le mécanisme d’acceptation différée.  
2. Description des programmes et de leurs prérequis.
1 2 3 4
Economie Mathématique et Econométrie - Economic Theory and Econometrics 
(ECOMATH) 
Politique Publique et Développement - Development Economics and Public 
Policies (PPD) 
Statistique et Econométrie - Statistitics and Econometrics (STA) 
Economie des marchés et des organisations - Economics of Markets & 
Organizations (EMO) 
Economie de l'environnement et des ressources naturelles - Environmental and 
Natural Resources Economics (ERNA) 
Economie et Droit de la Concurrence - Economics and Competition Law (ECL) 
Marchés et Intermédiaires financiers - Financial Markets and Intermediaries (MIF) 
In the above form, "1" means your number 1 choice, "2" means number 2, and so on.  
Dans le tableau précédent, le programme classé "1" correspond à votre choix numéro 1, le programme classé "2" 
correspond à votre choix numéro 2, etc. 
----- Page Break ----- 
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Figure E.5: The Deferred-Acceptance Mechanism with Truncation
Notes: This is the screen where an applicant submits her application under the Deferred-Acceptance mechanism with truncation
(i.e., submitting no more than 4 choices). It shows, in both English and French, (1) explanations that the application is used if
and only if the Deferred-Acceptance mechanism with truncation is chosen, (2) some tips that can be derived from the literature,
(3) the links to the pages describing the mechanism and the programs, and (4) the programs that each applicant can rank.
This screen is the same for every applicant, except that (1) the link to the next screen is randomized, (2) the order of the
programs presented is randomized, and (3) each applicant may reach this screen at different stage in the experiment.
A.32
